Tradition is not the worship of ashes, but the preservation of fire.—Gustav Mahler

Friday, April 08, 2016

Louise Arbour’s Administrative Unit 34B



Did you see the April 1, 2016 Munk Debate? The resolution debated was: 
Be it resolved, give us your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free . . . .” 
It was on the global refugee crisis, particularly the crisis in Europe. The participants were, in support of the motion, Louise Arbour & Simon Schama, and against the motion, Nigel Farage & Mark Steyn. The full debate was live streamed and then posted on Youtube, but it has since been taken down. If you register with the Munk Debates on its website, and it is for free, you can see the full debate. It is available here.

I am not going to comment on the debate’s details. It is worth watching in full. There are several good reviews, including one by Douglas Murray, of the Henry Jackson Society, in The Spectator

I think there was some deep support among the speakers and the audience that Western society has to be more assertive and actively integrate newcomers. [at 56:00–57:45 Steyn, at 1:03:30ff Steyn & Schama] Steyn made the point that to do that Western societies have to stand for something, have to believe something, have to have a history, language, and culture. There has to be something for the newcomer to integrate into.

I am not entirely sure Louise Arbour agreed with that above. 

Who is Louise Arbour?: 

The Honourable Louise Arbour’s career of public service includes sitting on the Supreme Court of Canada from 1999 to 2004, acting as the Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and serving as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. She was CEO of the renowned International Crisis Group from 2009 to 2014. Arbour is a Companion of the Order of Canada and recipient of twenty-seven honorary degrees.

Arbour is a member of the Global Commission on Drug Policy and of the International Commission Against the Death Penalty. She is also a member of the Advisory Board of The Coalition for the International Criminal Court. She chaired an inquiry commission that investigated certain events at the Prison for Women in Kingston, Ontario, and has also served as a member of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security.

Arbour has been a Companion of the Order of Canada since 2007 and a Grand Officer of the Ordre national du Québec since 2009, as well as a Commander of the Légion dhonneur, and has been decorated by both Spain, Colombia and Belgium. She is currently a jurist in residence at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP.


[here

Again, at one point, Steyn stated:
Holding a passport does not make you Canadian and does not make you Belgian and does not make you French. [at 1:04:30]
Later, Arbour stated:
If you have a Canadian passport, you are a Canadian citizen. [at 1:12:34]
As a technical, legal matter, Canadian nationals get to hold Canadian passports, and they are “Canadian citizens” in this legal sense and also in the everyday layperson’s sense. But if that is all it means to be a Canadian citizen, you can kiss social cohesion and integration in the West goodbye.

This is Louise Arbours Administrative Unit 34B.

Seth

PS: My co-bloggers do good work. So, please have a look around New Reform Club.

PPS: Here are links to Mark Steyns posts on the Munk Debate. [here] [here] [here] [here]

Twitter: https://twitter.com/SethBTillman ( @SethBTillman )

Seth Barrett Tillman, Louise Arbour’s Administrative Unit 34B, New Reform Club (Apr. 10, 2016, 3:38 PM), <https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2016/04/louise-arbour-34b.html>;

Seth Barrett Tillman, Part II, Louise Arbours Millions [of migrants] [of undocumented aliens] [of asylum seekers] [of stateless persons] [of internally displaced persons], New Reform Club (Apr. 11, 2016, 7:38 AM), <reformclub.blogspot.com/2016/04/part-i>;

My prior post is here: Seth Barrett Tillman, Trump Voters and Modern American Legal Academia, The New Reform Club (Apr. 8, 2016, 5:41 AM)



Trump Voters and Modern American Legal Academia




Some Comments on Jonathan Rowe’s Tensions Within the Synthesis of Originalism

In my prior New Reform Club post, The Two Discourses: How Non-Originalists Popularize Originalism and What that Means, I reviewed the traditional criticisms that non-originalists make in regard to originalism. I did not take a position in regard to the merits of the non-originalist’s critique. Rather, I was making an anthropological or sociological claim: (i) non-originalists exist; (ii) non-originalists have a non-frivolous critique of originalism (and for and about originalists); and (iii) non-originalism is the dominant position in legal academia.

I do not think these positions are particularly controversial.

I then turned to the Alliance for Justice (AFJ) letter, signed by more than 350 academics, mostly in law, which made essentially an originalist-intent-based argument. The letter argued that the Senate had a constitutionally mandated duty to consider the President’s nominees for the Supreme Court. I criticized both the substance of that letter, and the willingness of its many non-originalist signatories to promote an originalist-intent-type argument.

Over at American Creation blog,[1] Jonathan Rowe took the position that my critique of the AFJ letter was rooted in alleged duplicity or hypocrisy. Rowe explained: “I don’t defend the ethics of such practice. But I can’t find myself outraged by it either. . . . I’ve read too much Leo Strauss to be surprised that philosophers and politicians would engage in communication that offers one message to one set of people, and a different one to another set.” That’s not quite right. My primary concern was not rooted in duplicity or hypocrisy. So let me try again.

I do not know why each signatory signed this letter; only the signatories know why they signed. A variety of possible reasons come to mind. I find it very difficult to believe that most of these academics signed this letter because they agreed with its contents (as opposed to supporting its naked conclusion). Perhaps the non-originalists who signed this letter had some good reasons to sign this letter: a letter they do not really agree with, and perhaps the signatories will tell us what those reasons are. Perhaps. But they might not get around to explaining their real motives and genuinely held beliefs; indeed, they have not come forward to do so.

As I stated, the signatories may have had some good reasons to have signed this letter, but it is also possible to imagine some reasons which are not so good. And we are fully entitled to speculate on what those reasons might be. It is not as if we do not have a long history of non-originalists speculating on the real motives giving rise originalist discourse.[2]

One possible reason why the signatories might have signed this letter is that the signatories did not care to invest the time necessary to craft a fully fleshed-out argument along the intellectual lines they genuinely support. All 350 academics were just too busy; they just could not be bothered. They have time for clients and other causes, books and articles, but not for the public who they are seeking to influence. That’s not hypocrisy: that’s contempt. And if that is the reason, I expect the public will take the hint.

A second possibility which might explain why the signatories signed this letter is that a fully fleshed-out argument along the intellectual lines they genuinely support would not be understood by the public—or, at least, so they believe. It is not that the signatories are lazy; it is that the public is just too s-t-o-o-p-i-d to understand their great wisdom. (Surely, you are not so naive to believe that academics have an aspirational duty to reach out to the public and to educate them?) In such circumstances, the AFJ-350 have no good reason to put forward their genuinely held beliefs. That’s not hypocrisy: that’s elitism. And if that is the reason, I expect the public will take the hint.

There is a final possibility. Apparently, some non-originalists believe they are part of a victimized, long-suffering, powerless, discrete, insular intellectual minority. As Professor Jack Balkin, a prominent commentator (but not one of the Alliance-for-Justice-350), wrote:

Accepting that opposition as the proper frame for debate just locks liberals into a clever rhetorical strategy created by movement conservatives in the 1980s, who wanted to put themselves on the side of the American constitutional tradition, and liberals on the outside looking in. [here] [here] (emphasis added)

and,

The notion that in order for liberals to believe in a living Constitution they have to reject originalism in all of its forms is the biggest canard ever foisted on them. [here] [here] (emphasis added)[3]

In this intellectual milieu, signing a letter you do not really believe is not hypocrisy: it is virtue. Thus, signing such a letter is the natural and justified response of victims to an unfair world imposed upon them by malevolent intellectual forces which have deformed reasoned, public debate. That’s not hypocrisy: thats something else entirely. I am going to refrain from characterizing that reason, but I expect the public will take the hint. 

Is it any wonder that millions of Americans vote for Trump?

Seth

Twitter: https://twitter.com/SethBTillman ( @SethBTillman)

PS: My co-bloggers do good work. So, please have a look around New Reform Club.

My prior post on this subject is [here]: Seth Barrett Tillman, The Two Discourses: How Non-Originalists Popularize Originalism and What that Means, The New Reform Club (Mar. 28, 2016, 9:22 AM)

My prior post is [here]: Seth Barrett Tillman, Part 2: On Ted Cruz’s Eligibility for the Presidency, The New Reform Club (Apr. 7, 2016, 4:18 AM)





[1] An excellent blog. One of my regular intellectual ports of call.

[2] See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 545, 561 (2006) (asserting anthropomorphically: “As a political practice that developed in the 1980s, originalism seeks, more or less blatantly, to alter the Constitution so as to infuse it with conservative political principles.” (emphasis added)). Compare E-mail from Professor Gary Peller to the Georgetown Community (on or about Feb. 13, 2016) (“I imagine many other faculty, students and staff, particularly people of color, women and sexual minorities, cringed at headline and at the unmitigated praise with which the press release described a jurist that many of us believe was a defender of privilege, oppression and bigotry, one whose intellectual positions were not brilliant but simplistic and formalistic.”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/02/18/georgetown-law-professors-argue-over-how-and-whether-to-mourn-scalia/, with Kimberlé Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The Contradictions of Mainstream Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1683, 1710–11 (1998) (“The Romer decision is sophistry, but no more so than any other manipulation of the baseline from which governmental action is evaluated. Justice Scalia is right that, given the state’s power to criminalize homosexual conduct upheld in Bowers, it is implausible to contend that there is a constitutional duty to protect sexual minorities against discrimination. . . . But Scalia is not ‘right’ because there is no reason to accept the old common-law baseline that Scalia proposes either.” (footnote omitted)). Remarkable—courageousa wholly transparent willingness to speak truth to power when it really counted—when Antonin Scalia was alive and might have responded.

Readers—feel free to add further examples of this literature in the comments section below.

[3] If this was the “biggest canard,” will Professor Balkin ever tell us what the lesser canards were? 

Thursday, April 07, 2016

Part 2: On Ted Cruz's Eligibility for the Presidency



William Alexander Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States § 652, at 168 (New York, Collins and Hannay 1833):


All persons born out of the jurisdiction of the United States, are terms Aliens; but there are some exceptions to this rule, derived from the ancient English law; as in the case of children of public Ministers born abroad, whose parent owed not even a local allegiance to the foreign power; and all children born abroad of English parents, were considered as natives of England, if the father went and continued abroad in the character of an English subject.” (emphasis added)), http://tinyurl.com/ja7vhav;  

     and, 

James Bayard, A Brief Exposition of the Constitution of the United States 96 (Philadelphia, Hogan & Thompson 1833) (“It is not necessary that a man should be born in this country, to be ‘a natural born citizen.’ It is only requisite he should be a citizen by birth, and that is the case with all the children of citizens who have ever resided in this country, though born in a foreign country.”), http://tinyurl.com/hvr87md; 

     and, 

John Hancock, The Constitution and Government of the United States § 255, at 62 (Philadelphia, Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger 3d ed. 1871) (“It is not necessary that a man should be born in this country, to be ‘natural-born citizen.’ It is only requisite he should be a citizen by birth . . . .”), http://tinyurl.com/jop5ug6. 

Duers, Bayard’s, and Hancocktreatises are not cited in: Professor Mary Brigid McManamon, The Natural Born Citizen Clause as Originally Understood, 64 Catholic University Law Review 317, 318 (2015) (As I researched the [Natural Born Citizen] Clause, it quickly became clear to me that most modern scholars had made virtually no attempt to wrestle with the text of the Constitution and their historical analyses were negligent at best. (footnote omitted)). 

Seth

PS: My co-bloggers do good work. So, please have a look around New Reform Club

Twitter: https://twitter.com/SethBTillman ( @SethBTillman )

My prior post is [here]: Seth Barrett Tillman, Some Thoughts on Plagiarism, Plagiarists, Fools, and Legal Fools (Apr. 6, 2016, 2:11 PM). 






Wednesday, April 06, 2016

Some Thoughts on Plagiarism, Plagiarists, Fools, and Legal Fools



[Reading] has the distinct drawback that, if indulged in to excess, it almost always destroys the precious illusion of the originality of one’s own insights.
—Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.[1]

What Is Plagiarism?
Generally, plagiarism is making use of other people’s words or their ideas without sufficient acknowledgment. If you make use of someone else’s ideas, i.e., if someone else’s ideas are the source or origin for something you have written, then you owe that author a complete citation, i.e., a citation providing sufficient information so that your readers can find the source. If you make use of someone else’s words, you must surround their words with quotation marks and also use a complete citation. It is a simple rule.

Still I think there are a few outlier and difficult cases which are worth thinking about.

Case I. What If Your Source’s Author Is Idiosyncratic?
To whom is owed the duty to cite? Is it owed to the author of your source or to your readers? If the former, then that author might not want to be cited. He may be embarrassed by his prior writing and not want it flagged anew to the public.[2] Alternatively, your source’s author may not like you or your writing, and not enjoy seeing his own “good” work appearing in your “bad” work. Here too, he may prefer not to be cited. He might even give you an express release! Finally, your source’s author may like you and your writing, and wish to be helpful by allowing you to enjoy a bit of (undeserved) goodwill among your readers.[3] Again, in such circumstances, your source’s author may prefer not to be cited. What to do?

Case II. The Wholly New Context.
Another problem sometimes happens when you use someone else’s phrase, sentence, paragraph, etc in an entirely novel way or in a context entirely divorced from the original author’s. Is a citation strictly owed in such circumstances?

In his 1968 Rivers of Blood speech, Enoch Powell wrote: “I can already hear the chorus of execration.” “Chorus of execration”—my lord—a truly unforgettable turn of the phrase. It is not found, as far as I can tell, in the Bible or in any standard translation of the classics. It was used many years prior to Powell by F. Scott Fitzgerald, and also prior to Fitzgerald, by Arthur Conan Doyle. I have no reason to think Powell (knowingly or, even, inadvertently) lifted this phrase from Fitzgerald or Doyle or from anyone else, but even if Powell had done so, his using this phrase was in a context entirely removed from these prior authors. Moreover, putting a citation in a live speech, or even at its end, would really interfere with the flow of the speech. In such circumstances, is a citation strictly owed? Would it matter if Powell had reproduced the speech—and its memorable phrase—in a book of collected speeches? 

Tillman's Addendum: November 30, 2025:
2 Francis Hitchman, The Public Life of the Right Honourable the Earl of Beaconsfield, K.G., London: Chapman and Hall 337 (1879), [https://tinyurl.com/5y89aezx]; 

Case III. The Fool And The Damned Fool.
Now let’s say you’ve read a paper by Professor Alpha on a subject which you had already given a good deal of consideration. Alpha’s paper says “X is true because Y.” If prior to reading Alpha’s paper, you had also come to the conclusion that “X is true because Y,” and then you proceed to write in your own paper “X is true because Y,” do you owe Alpha and his paper a citation? I think many, perhaps most, would say “yes,” but I do not think it is quite so clear. You are not lifting someone else’s idea—the idea is also (ex hypothesi) your own, although Alpha published first. If you came to the idea independently, then Alpha is not your source.

You might not owe Alpha a citation in such circumstances, but you would be a fool not to cite Alpha. You may know that you independently came up with the same idea, but Alpha and his colleagues may not. Even worse, Alpha and his colleagues may believe you, but there may be someone in an entirely different field who does not like you or who, perhaps, makes a living finding (or has an active professional sideline involving) cases of plagiarism. Anyone can allege plagiarism, not just the uncited author.

There are other good reasons you should cite Alpha, not just self-preservation. Kindness. Alpha may want and/or need the citation, and what does it really cost you to cite Alpha? Frequently, authors like to be cited: this includes junior authors, particularly those seeking an academic position, or those already in academia who are undergoing review for tenure or promotion. Such authors are often very grateful, and they will sometimes try to cite you in turn (or return).

Now everything I said above applies to the arts and sciences, but it applies even more strongly to those who write about law. In law, the best way to kill an idea is to claim that it is original or new. If you want to promote “your” idea, then give it a (deserved) heritage or genealogy. If other people independently came up with the same idea as you, then you are killing your own idea if you fail to cite them. Moreover, giving others fair credit builds up your credibility with your audience, as does adherence to professional standards in general.

Above, I suggested that only a fool would fail to cite Professor Alpha. But if the subject matter is law, then I suggest that only a damned fool would fail to cite Alpha.

Case IV. What If You Have Two Independent Sources For A Proposition?

Suppose Professor Alpha in his paper wrote:
“X is true because of Y.”
And Professor Beta in her paper also wrote:
“X is true because of Y.”

Now you decide to write your own paper, and in it, you write: “X is true because of Y.” The idea is not your own. Because the idea is not yours, you need a citation. So which paper do you cite: Alpha’s paper or Beta’s paper? You can cite either or both.

If you cite only one of the two, how do you decide which? You have much leeway here: you could flip a coin, you could cite your friend, the first of the two to be published, etc. If one of the two papers is better known in regard to the particular proposition being cited, then perhaps you should cite that paper. I would think that principles of fair play—although not absolutely mandatory—should push you in the direction of citing the source that was the greater influence on your thinking in regard to the cited proposition.

Again, you have some choice here. But there is a limit. Let’s say that you have not actually read or examined Beta’s paper. Instead, you only know about Beta’s position because many, many third-party sources ascribe it to her and quote her paper. You might have 100s of such third-party sources ascribing this position to Beta, if not actually quoting Beta. Here, the bottom line is that you must quote Alpha, and not Beta.

You can only cite what you have seen, and here, you have not actually seen Beta’s paper. Sure you could quote the third-party sources which in turn quote Beta. But you cannot cite directly to Beta’s paper because you have not seen Beta’s paper. A citation indicates that an idea is not yours. But a citation also indicates that you have read and examined the source cited, as opposed to some other source that purportedly says the same thing. If you have not actually read and examined a source, you ought not pretend that you did. Such a citation lacks transparency, truthfulness, and candor.

It is also unsafe to trust that the third-party sources got it right (or were themselves truthful).

Imagine if you had read Professor B’s book, and B is later, much later unmasked as a fraud, i.e., a person who quotes and cites to nonexistent sources. But before B is unmasked, you innocently read B’s book. Now if B’s book had said “source X stated that ‘Y is true’.” You might have thought that you had a choice between: (1) quoting B’s book for the proposition that “source X stated that ‘Y is true’”; or (2) quoting source X directly for the proposition that “Y is true.”

You might think that the second choice is simpler. It imposes less on the reader, and makes your writing crisper. But your putting forward such a citation is not truthful. It is not truthful because the source you have cited (i.e., source X) is not the one you have seen, examined, and relied upon. It is not truthful because you have not given credit to the actual source you have seen, examined, and relied upon (i.e., Bs book)—thereby denying your readers the opportunity to verify your actual source. Moreover, such a course of action is imprudent. If you lift Professor B’s words or ideas (absent proper acknowledgement), and B is in error or untruthful, then you become a party to B’s wrong. If B is a liar (because source X does not exist), then your citing directly to source X makes your conduct wrongful too. 

There is a happy confluence between doing the right thing and doing the prudent thing: you can only cite what you have seen (and examined).

Seth

PS: My co-bloggers do good work. So, please have a look around New Reform Club.

Twitter: https://twitter.com/SethBTillman ( @SethBTillman )

Seth Barrett Tillman, Some Thoughts on Plagiarism, Plagiarists, Fools, and Legal Fools, New Reform Club (Apr. 6, 2016, 2:11 PM), <https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2016/04/some-thoughts-on-plagiarism-plagiarists.html>; 

My prior post is [here]: Seth Barrett Tillman, Metrics from the Social Science Research Network on Irish Law Departments (including Tillman’s department) (Apr. 3, 2016, 5:45 AM).




[1] Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 L. & Contemp. Prob. 87, 88–89 (1976).

[2] I am sometimes cited by other authors, who go on to state that my position is incorrect. I should hope no one hesitates to cite me in such circumstances. Cite me as correct or cite me as incorrect—I really do not care—just spell my name and my papers’ titles correctly!

[3] If at the end of a trial, a criminal defendant’s attorney used (John Mortimer’s) Rumpole’s standard closing speech, should the attorney flag his source to his client, the Court, and/or to the jury (if there is a jury)? See, e.g., John Mortimer, Rumpole and the Penge Bungalow Murders 196–97 (2004). 

Monday, April 04, 2016

The Republicans' Open Convention

I am a Cruz supporter. Cruz has been working to close the nomination deal. Either he does, or he doesn't. That's his problem.

It isn't "unfair" if he doesn't manage it.

Same with Trump, Kasich or anyone else. Everyone knew how things worked going in, or should have. Everyone certainly had time to find out how things worked over the last year. There's nothing unfair going on - this is how the process works. It's not news. Whichever candidate gets nominated is the one who is able to close the nomination deal.

You can complain about the GOP backroom establishment all you want. That won't change the facts. Everyone knew the facts going in. This is life. Conservatives don't whine about how badly life treats them, or how things are unfair. The world doesn't owe us anything, nor does the process owe any of the candidates anything. The process is the process; it is a well-known process.

That is all.

Trump and the Hunter's Snare

Recently, Donald Trump made a statement about punishing women for trying to get an abortion. While he has walked those remarks back, many of his supporters continue to insist that Trump was essentially correct - women should be punished for abortion.

Here is the transcript of Trump's abortion remarks, with the relevant portion below:

MATTHEWS: Do you believe in punishment for abortion, yes or no as a principle?
TRUMP: The answer is that there has to be some form of punishment.
MATTHEWS: For the woman.
TRUMP: Yeah, there has to be some form.
MATTHEWS: Ten cents? Ten years? What?
TRUMP: I don’t know. That I don’t know. That I don’t know.
MATTHEWS: Why not?
TRUMP: I don’t know.
MATTHEWS: You take positions on everything else.
TRUMP: Because I don’t want to -- I frankly, I do take positions on everything else. It’s a very complicated position.
MATTHEWS: But you say, one, that you’re pro-life, meaning you want to ban it.
TRUMP: But wait a minute, wait a minute. But the Catholic Church is pro-life.
MATTHEWS: No, let’s not talk about my religion.

Has the pro-life side (a) ever said women should be punished and (b) displayed inconsistency by saying women should not be punished? After all, if it is murder, shouldn't the one attempting murder be punished?

The answers are (a) no, no state in the Union has ever prosecuted a woman for attempting to have an abortion, nor has the pro-life side ever attempted to get that to happen and (b) no, it is not inconsistent to say that the abortionist should be punished while the woman should not be.

Consider: a man who attempts suicide has, according to pro-life principles, also attempted to commit murder. So has anyone who assists such a man in his suicide attempt. Yet pro-lifers have always insisted that only doctors who assist suicide (e.g., Dr. Kevorkian) should be prosecuted, not the man who attempts it or who hires Dr. Kevorkian to assist him in completing it.

For those who insist Trump is correct to punish women, I ask a simple question: would you also support prosecuting and punishing those who attempt suicide?

And for those who do not like this analogy, keep in mind what Planned Parenthood itself celebrates as a pro-abortion attitude:

In a magazine article some years ago I wrote, “No one wants an abortion as she wants an ice-cream cone or a Porsche. She wants an abortion as an animal, caught in a trap, wants to gnaw off its own leg.”
To my surprise, this line revealed a place of agreement in the midst of the deadlock. Not only was it quickly picked up by sympathetic pro-lifers, but it was “Quote of the Week” in Planned Parenthood’s Public Affairs Action Letter, and “Quote of the Month” in the Pro-Choice Network newsletter. Apparently pro-choice partisans could agree with pro-lifers that, no matter what their political differences, abortion was a miserable choice.

We don't punish people who are trapped by the hunter's snare. We punish the people who ensnared them.

Trump answered as a pro-abort Democrat imagines a pro-lifer would answer. He is wrong, and all who agree with him are wrong.

"Honest Graft": The REAL math of raising the minimum wage



Is the government raising the minimum wage a good thing?  It all depends, but make no mistake, goodness has nothing to do with it. Noah Rothman in Commentary:

In February of 2014, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office released a study that found raising the minimum wage to $10.10 per hour by 2016 would hike earnings marginally for up to 16.5 million workers, but that would come at a cost. Approximately 500,000 lower-skilled workers would lose their jobs, and “the income of most workers who became jobless would fall substantially.” In early 2014, with the official unemployment rate stable at 6.7 percent, that did not seem to many like a tradeoff worth making.
Nonsense, the left declared...
Add in the moral vanity in feeling you're lifting the unfortunate--not to mention the unalloyed delight of sticking it to The Man--and as George Washington Plunkitt of the most ingeniously corrupt political machine in American history, New York's Tammany Hall, summed it up, it's

Another kind of honest graft. Tammany has raised a good many salaries. There was an awful howl by the reformers, but don’t you know that Tammany gains ten votes for every one it lost by salary raisin'?
The Wall Street banker thinks it shameful to raise a department clerk’s salary from $1500 to $1800 a year, but every man who draws a salary himself says: “That’s all right. I wish it was me.” And he feels very much like votin' the Tammany ticket on election day, just out of sympathy."
For every person you screw, dozens more get the goodies, and that translates to votes, baby, votes. The math of buying votes--with other people's money!--is a political elegance for the ages, worked every time it's tried.

Sunday, April 03, 2016

Does it matter if any of the American founders were Christians?

Some time ago, I used to post over at the American Creation blog, and one of the major recurring topics over there regards the religious beliefs & practice of the American founders. Were they Christians? What kind of Christians? Devout? Lax? Nicene orthodox? Unitarian? You get the idea.

Apart from the very real difficulty of accurately describing the religious views of some of the founders (who, for example, can coherently describe whatever Thomas Jefferson happened to believe at any given moment?), this kind of questioning is quite popular. It shows up quite a bit in constitutional law scholarship discussing the First Amendment's religion clauses and the role of faith in public life.  And yet...

Over at The American Conservative online, writer Paul Gottfried argues that this whole line of questioning is mistaken: Was George Washington a Christian? According to Gottfried's approach the relevant question isn't what did the founders believe? rather it is what kind of social and political order did the founders intend to create?  Gottfried has some thoughts on both questions, and his ideas are well worth pondering.  I particularly am struck by his framing of the debate about religion and the Founding Era. Worth a read.

Metrics from the Social Science Research Network on Irish Law Departments (including Tillman's department)

Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”)
Top 500 International Law Schools
Listing Law Schools in Ireland (including Northern Ireland, UK)
Updated Monthly: Last Updated on APRIL 1, 2016
Ranked by: Total # of Downloads for All Time
                                                              

Rank

Institution
83
National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Department of Law :: Ireland
(64)
(85)
(38)
(83)
(88)
(71)
(145)
(37)
84
Queen's University Belfast - School of Law :: Ireland
(65)
(57)
(105)
(84)
(65)
(158)
(75)
(103)
96
UCD :: Ireland
(97)
(46)
(149)
(96)
(72)
(152)
(80)
(108)
168
National University of Ireland, Galway (NUIG) - School of Law :: Ireland
(149)
5
(206)
(92)
(168)
(151)
(154)
(145)
(161)
215
Trinity College (Dublin) - School of Law :: Ireland
(245)
1
(354)
(*)
(215)
(285)
(*)
2
(420)
(*)
395
University College Cork - School of Law :: Ireland
(341)
4
(231)
(*)
(395)
(295)
(*)
6
(244)
(270)



Keep in mind that not every active Irish law department posts to SSRN. And among those departments listed above, some departments have one or more faculty members who do not post to SSRN. 

Seth
Maynooth University Department of Law
National University of Ireland Maynooth 

PS: My co-bloggers do good work. So, please have a look around New Reform Club

Twitter: https://twitter.com/SethBTillman ( @SethBTillman )

My prior post is [here]: Seth Barrett Tillman, Part IV: Why Senate Inaction As A Response To A Presidential Nomination Is Constitutional (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:50 PM).