re:
Jess Coleman, The Supreme Court’s Originalists Are Cracking Up, TNR
(July 7, 2026), <https://newrepublic.com/article/212556/supreme-court-originalism-trump-barbara>.
In Trump
v. Slaughter (2026), the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinion
announced: “[I]n Federalist No. 77, Hamilton said that the Senate’s
consent ‘would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint,’ but it remains
a subject of scholarly debate whether Hamilton meant ‘displace’ in the sense of
‘remove’ or ‘replace.’” Jess Coleman objects. Coleman affirms the correctness
of the ‘displace’-means-‘remove’ position, and he announces that the contrary
position is ‘bizarre.’
I
have argued in academic journals since 2010, that is, long before Trump entered
politics, that Hamilton’s ‘displace’-language means ‘replace’ and not ‘remove.’
Those who argue that ‘displace’ means ‘remove’ tend to clip only one sentence
from Federalist No. 77, but if you read the entire paragraph in
which that sentence appears, you will see that the discussion is better
understood as involving replacing officers, as opposed to simply removing them.
See <The Avalon Project : Federalist No 77>.
Furthermore,
in his celebrated Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story
affirmed that Hamilton’s ‘displace’-language was about replacing, as opposed to
removing, officers. See <THE NEW REFORM CLUB: Strained (and Sloppy) Readings of the
Constitution and Strained (and Sloppy) Readings of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77
(Updated)>. More recently, it has come to light that, in his private
correspondence to Senator Webster, Chancellor James Kent affirmed that Hamilton’s
‘displace’-language was speaking to replacing, as opposed to removing,
officers. See <https://reason.com/volokh/2025/11/20/chancellor-james-kent-on-hamiltons-federalist-no-77-and-modern-academic-commentary/>.
Whether
Hamilton’s ‘displace’-language was speaking to replacing officers or to
removing officers is a matter about which reasonable persons have and can
disagree. Jess Coleman’s suggesting that one of these two views is ‘bizarre’ speaks
to an unfortunate epistemic closure prevalent among far too many who would seek
to guide and explain the world to others. By contrast, when the Slaughter
Court cautiously recognized the long-standing historical dispute about
the meaning of Federalist No. 77 and the Court’s majority
actively chose not to inject itself into that debate, the Court acted in the
sort of cautious manner that we should applaud, and not object.
Sincerely,
Seth
Barrett Tillman, Associate Professor
Seth Barrett Tillman, ‘A Letter to The New Republic on Epistemic Closure,’ New Reform Club (July 17, 2026, 5:36 AM), <https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2026/07/a-letter-to-new-republic-on-epistemic.html>.