The following language was in the per curiam opinion in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, NY v. Cuomo.
If only 10 people
are admitted to each service, the great majority of those who wish to attend
Mass on Sunday or services in a synagogue on Shabbat will be barred.
Slip opinion at page 5, <https://tinyurl.com/y4zewqz8>. I have to suggest . . . the language here . . . isn’t it odd? Right? And . . . the 5 members of the Supreme Court joining the per curiam opinion are: Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ. Not a Jewish person in the bunch. Right? So isn’t this language a bit odd? Just a little? I am not complaining, but if an executive body did this . . . would not we characterize this as some sort of establishment of religion? I am not complaining . . . but why would the Court do this? Why did not the dissenters—dissent? Is not there one ACLU-type Supreme Court law clerk around?
Can I get odds on whether this language will make it into United States Reports?
5 … 4 … 3 … 2 … 1: Someone
will blame this on Trump. Just a matter of time.
Seth
Seth Barrett Tillman, Blame It On Trump, New Reform Club (Nov. 26, 2020, 1:37 PM), <https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2020/11/blame-it-on-trump.html>;
6 comments:
You'll have to speak slower for me.
How does access to Mass and Shabbat establish a religion? (especially since Judaism and Roman Catholicism were established in the US prior to 2020?)
You point out that the example is taken verbatim from a briefing submitted by one plaintiff. Are they not allowed to use the arguments presented to them?
Perhaps they used 'Shabbat' because it's a lot less clunky than 'from sunset on Friday to sunset on Saturday'?
I concur with Mr. Enns, except that I'm not confident that he's correctly interpreted your post.
I'm not sure I have, either. What on earth are you trying to say, here?
Here's the language you call "odd": "If only 10 people are admitted to each service, the great majority of those who wish to attend Mass on Sunday or services in a synagogue on Shabbat will be barred."
It's a statement of fact. Nobody denies it's true. What on earth is dubious about it? You add, "Right?" as if you expect the reader to concur in some chummy fashion. Well, sorry, I've no idea what you're getting at, and I suspect the author(s) of the opinion would never have expected that sentence to attract any special scrutiny.
The rest of your post doesn't help much, either. You note, "[T]he 5 members of the Supreme Court joining the per curiam opinion are: Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett...." Okay, and? "Not a Jewish person in the bunch. Right?"
No, but so what? Are you implying that, to concur in an opinion, a justice has to be personally and directly affected not merely by the opinion, but by each example mentioned in it? Since when?
Furthermore, everyone knows the divide here is not between Christians and Jews (or Catholics and Protestants, or Arminians and Calvinists, or Post-Trib and Mid-Trib Premillennial Dispensationalists, or any other such merely-sectarian detail) but between seriously-practicing religious persons, and persons who regard religious practice as an indifferent relic of their ancestry. If a ruling on religious practice impacted users of peyote (a noteworthy religious practice not seen in other faiths), then one might expect an Orthodox Jew (for whom circumcision is similarly noteworthy) and a Jehovah Witness (blood transfusions) to contribute to the opinion. And, sure, might expect Kagan, Breyer, and Sotomayor (none of whom practice their ancestral faiths) to prescind. But one wouldn't require only justices that specifically use peyote to opine!
Re: "So isn’t this language a odd? Just a little? I am not complaining, but if an executive body did this . . . would not we characterize this as some sort of establishment of religion?"
No. No, we wouldn't. To "establish," in this context, would require some kind of promotion of Mass or Shabbat at the expense of other faiths (or worldviews, or cultural habits, or fandoms).
But in this case, the topic at hand is not "shall the government promote Mass and Shabbat at the expense of those who visit gambling casinos on weekends?"; but rather, "shall the government stop prejudicially prohibiting Mass and Shabbat while preferentially promoting gambling and street protesting?"
It is the current situation which represents an "establishment of religion" (where "religion" is extended to include all functionally-religious apocalyptic and redemptive cults, such as Antifa and SJW-ism).
By allowing Mass and Shabbat back into the mix, the opinion argues (if anything) for HALTING an establishment of religion.
Is not Kagan Jewish and dissenter?
I'm pretty sure the specifics referring to Catholicism and Judaism were due to the fact that, as the opinion explains, "The two applications, one filed by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and the other by Agudath Israel of America and affiliated entities, contend that these restrictions violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."
I doubt that the Majority had any intention of limiting this freedom to those religions, and no court should interpret it as doing so.
Please learn what the establishment and free exercise con law principles are before jibbering about them.
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