President George Washington’s Multiple Purchases Involving Federal Lands
The purpose of this post is to further develop, accentuate, and clarify a point I developed in my 2017 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy paper, in my several amicus briefs (filed by Professor Josh Blackman), and in our (Blackman’s and my) recent post on The Volokh Conspiracy.
In his July
25, 2018 opinion denying the Department of Justice’s motion to dismiss in DC & MD v. Trump, Judge Messitte (D.
Md.) concluded that the Domestic Emoluments Clause and its “emoluments”
language reaches the President’s private commercial transactions with domestic government
entities. This understanding of “emoluments” includes all such transactions, even if the President does not
have a traditional employment-like relationship with the party on the other
side of the transaction. Judge Messitte reached that conclusion only after he
rejected as good historical precedent President Washington’s several land
transactions in 1793 with the federal government. Messitte rejected the
precedential value of these transactions for two reasons.
First, Judge Messitte said the
historical record in regard to these transactions was “seriously incomplete.” Slip
op. at 46. Specifically, he stated that there was no information as to: [i]
what kind of land auction was held; [ii] how it was advertised; and, [iii] how
many bidders were involved. The Blackman-Tillman amicus brief
put forward good authority answering each of these three questions—[i] it was
an open auction with oral bids; [ii] it was advertised in a Philadelphia
newspaper 6 months prior; and, [iii] there were some 18 bidders. See Blackman-Tillman
Br. at 28–29.
Judge Messitte also stated that
the whole transaction was suspect because “Washington later made clear that he was ‘ready
to relinquish’ the property.” Slip
op. at 46. Messitte based his conclusion here on representations made by
Plaintiffs in their brief. But Plaintiffs erred here, and Messitte erred in relying
on their representations—all of which were squarely contrary to the Department of Justice’s brief,
to the primary document cited by both
parties, and to my prior
scholarship on this point. See Tillman, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy,
761 & n.7, 762 & n.13. Washington bought four lots of land at public
auction on September 18, 1793. That is lots nos. 5, 12, 13, and 14 in square 667 (in the new federal capital), for which Washington was given
two separate certificates of purchase.
Washington never
expressed, in any way, any desire to relinquish that land—i.e., the land he
purchased in 1793. Instead, what Washington did do was to express an interest
in making further purchases in the future—in square 21 (again, in the
new federal capital). Washington explained in a 1794 letter to his land commissioners:
“I should be glad to know what my prospect
is; adding, that I am as ready to relinquish, as I was to imbibe the idea, of this [future] purchase.” Founders Online (emphasis
added). Again, Professor Josh Blackman and I explained in our prior post on The Volokh Conspiracy that the 1793 land
purchases are a substantial public precedent
from early Executive Branch practice indicating that the President’s private
commercial transactions—even with the federal government—are not “emoluments”
and are not subject to the Domestic Emoluments Clause. Moreover, no
contemporaneous or subsequent authorities (of which we are aware) have ever
suggested that President Washington acted unconstitutionally (or, even,
unethically) until litigation began against President Trump. Once the
litigation against President Trump began, an Orwellian project of rewriting our
national history took shape. Regrettably, Judge Messitte’s recent judicial
opinion embraced that revisionism. (Representations of just this sort have been pattern-and-practice by plaintiffs and their supporting amici in each of the three Emoluments Clauses lawsuits: I write from personal experience.)
Here I clarify
what happened subsequent to 1793.
In 1794, President Washington went forward, just as he had suggested he might, and purchased square
21. In other words, what had been an “idea” became a reality. See From
George Washington to the Commissioners for the District of Columbia, 14 March
1794, Founders Online (last
accessed Sept. 23, 2018), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-15-02-0289
(“GW ultimately purchased square 21.”).
All these facts—both
the original purchases at the 1793 government auction and the subsequent
purchase in 1794—are supported by a pellucidly clear documentary record. Yet,
Judge Messitte characterizes all these transactions as a “single example” involving the
President’s purchasing federal lands. Slip
op. at 46 (emphasis added). The historical reality is quite different: there were, at the
very least, two such transactions: one in 1793 and one in 1794. There may even have been as many
as five Washington land transactions: four separate purchases in 1793, and a
fifth in 1794. (In other words, a separate purchase for each of the 4 lots purchased in 1793 and a fifth purchase for square 21 in 1794.) More importantly, the evidence of the 1794 land transaction confirms Blackman’s and my interpretation
(and the DOJ’s interpretation) of Washington’s 1794 letter to his land commissioners.
When Washington wrote: “I should be glad to know what my
prospect is; adding, that I am as ready to relinquish, as I was to imbibe the
idea, of this purchase,”
he was writing about an idea—that is, an idea for a future land purchase. He
ultimately consummated that future land purchase in 1794. It was square 21.
What does all
this mean? It means notwithstanding titanic efforts by Plaintiffs (which misled
the court) to impeach the 1793 land transaction(s) as on-point, that view cannot
withstand genuine historical scrutiny. Washington’s 1793 land purchases are an
on-point precedent showing that early Executive Branch practice permitted the
President to do business with the federal government, notwithstanding the Domestic
Emoluments Clause and its “emoluments” language. (Indeed, one of
President Washington’s land commissioners served on the Supreme Court of the United States and had also been Chief Judge of the General Court of Maryland.)
The choice then is a simple one: either Judge Messitte was right in 2018, and President Washington (and the American public) was wrong in 1793 and 1794; or, President Washington was right, and Judge Messitte is wrong. They cannot both be right. Then-Justice Rehnquist stated the appropriate rule in Wallace v. Jaffree: “[N]o amount of repetition of historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true.” 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The choice then is a simple one: either Judge Messitte was right in 2018, and President Washington (and the American public) was wrong in 1793 and 1794; or, President Washington was right, and Judge Messitte is wrong. They cannot both be right. Then-Justice Rehnquist stated the appropriate rule in Wallace v. Jaffree: “[N]o amount of repetition of historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true.” 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Pending before the District of Maryland is the DOJ’s motion to certify an interlocutory appeal. DOJ asserts that Judge Messitte’s “reasoning” about
Washington’s participation in the 1793 land auction “is premised on a factual
error introduced by Plaintiffs.” The DOJ adds that this historical error
warrants certification so the Fourth Circuit can assess the proper scope of the
term “emoluments”:
This historical example is significant
not only because it involved the conduct of President Washington, but also
because one of the three D.C. Commissioners had attended the Constitutional
Convention, and the other two had voted in the state ratification conventions.
See MTD at 43–44. And yet, no concern was raised about a possible violation of
the Domestic Emoluments Clause. Reasonable jurists thus could disagree about
whether this example should tip the scale in favor of the narrower
interpretation of “Emolument.”
I agree. I would urge Judge Messitte to do the right thing: he should
either retract his error, or grant the DOJ’s motion so another court can
consider this well-documented historical record.
Seth Barrett Tillman, New Evidence That President Washington, and not Judge Messitte, Was Right about the Domestic Emoluments Clause, New Reform Club (Sept. 23, 2018, 11:29 AM),
1 comment:
Maddening when plain facts simply don't matter to these people.
First, Judge Messitte said the historical record in regard to these transactions was “seriously incomplete.” Slip op. at 46. Specifically, he stated that there was no information as to: [i] what kind of land auction was held; [ii] how it was advertised; and, [iii] how many bidders were involved. The Blackman-Tillman amicus brief put forward good authority answering each of these three questions—[i] it was an open auction with oral bids; [ii] it was advertised in a Philadelphia newspaper 6 months prior; and, [iii] there were some 18 bidders. See Blackman-Tillman Br. at 28–29.
The one that gets me is how Harry Blackmun dropped "hideous" from Blackstone's description of abortion as a "hideous misdemeanor," changing the entire meaning of the quote.
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