Tradition is not the worship of ashes, but the preservation of fire.—Gustav Mahler

Wednesday, July 16, 2025

A Response to Professor Jack Rakove

 

Editors(@)WashingtonMonthly.com

 

Re: Jack Rakove, ‘It’s Not Just a Constitutional Crisis in the Trump Era. It’s Constitutional Failure,’ Washington Monthly (June 27, 2025), <https://tinyurl.com/33er4nf7>.

Professor Rakove wrote:


The Court thus casually squandered an opportunity to clarify the meaning of a provision that badly needs enforcement. All previous presidents had scrupulously adhered to the Emoluments Clauses, which embody the fundamental principle that presidents should neither seek nor hold office for private gain.


Two other cases [involving the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses], however, progressed in the lower courts, but once they were appealed, the Supreme Court slow-walked them until Trump left office, leaving the issue moot.

These claims are not correct, and Rakove puts not a shred of evidence forward supporting his positions.

The facts are these. The parties on both sides of the two cases before the U.S. Supreme Court represented to the Court that the cases were moot. In these circumstances, where the parties no longer had a live, continuing dispute, the Court had no real choice but to dismiss the case. The effect of that, under settled doctrine, was to vacate the lower court decisions which had adjudicated the meanings of the Emoluments Clauses. As a result, there are no binding federal circuit court precedents or persuasive district court precedents expounding on the scope of the Emoluments Clauses’ less-than-entirely-clear language. In fact, the situation was considerably more complex than plaintiffs’ Supreme Court filings let on. Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claim against Trump (qua the President) was moot once Biden became President. But plaintiffs’ individual-capacity claim against Trump (qua the individual) remained actionable. Plaintiffs chose not to pursue their individual-capacity claim. Why they did this only they know.

Moreover, had these cases reached the U.S. Supreme Court in a timely fashion, then the Court may have had time to reach a decision on the merits. But the trial court proceedings moved slowly. There were three such lawsuits. The first case, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) v. Trump (filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York)was filed timely: it was brought during January 2017, at the beginning of Trump’s first term. But the Blumenthal v. Trump complaint (filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia) was lodged considerably later: during June 2017, not January 2017. Likewise, the DC & MD v. Trump complaint (filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland) was also lodged during June 2017. There were other causes of delay. Plaintiffs filed multiple amended complaints in each case. And plaintiffs repeatedly sought extensions in regard to the timing of their briefs.

Defendant Trump-the-President (i.e., the official-capacity defendant) and Defendant Trump-the-Individual (i.e., the individual-capacity defendant) only sought one extension in one of the three cases on one occasion—a single extension which was only prompted by plaintiffs’ having first sought an amended schedule seeking an extension for plaintiffs. Had the plaintiffs adhered to the original schedule, the defendants would not have sought any extension.

Similarly, plaintiffs, when seeking to appeal, were also dilatory. Rather than seeking to appeal and seeking certiorari soon after an unfavourable final judgment, plaintiffs took the full (or nearly the full) time period in which to file: their appeals to the federal circuit courts of appeals and their certiorari petitions for discretionary U.S. Supreme Court review.

As for the lower courts, Judge Sullivan (District of Columbia) and Judge Messitte (District of Maryland) were slow in calling for and holding an oral argument after briefing had closed, and they were slow to issue a final order after having held oral argument. Indeed, Messitte bifurcated his response to the official-capacity defendant’s motion to dismiss. In other words, Judge Messitte held two oral arguments and issued two separate opinions based on the official-capacity defendant’s single motion to dismiss. And, Messitte never resolved the individual-capacity defendant’s motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding his unwillingness to address Trump’s individual-capacity motion to dismiss, Messitte nevertheless ordered Trump to submit to discovery. Odd.

The delay, such as there was, was not caused by the Supreme Court and it was not caused by Trump and his lawyers. The simple fact is that: Plaintiffs ran out the clock. It is likely that they had strategic reasons for doing so. Perhaps they thought that the U.S. Supreme Court would be an unfriendly forum, and they sought to end the lawsuits before losing on the merits? It was plaintiffs’ tactical decisions which left the U.S. Supreme Court with no opportunity and no time to act on these appeals. And again: the plaintiffs chose not to actively pursue their individual-capacity claim against Trump. Why? If there is blame here, look first to the plaintiffs and their (lawyers’) strategic choices. Then look to the lower courts. There was one exception: Judge Daniels (Southern District of New York) worked impartially, promptly, and professionally in every sense. A true role model.

Professor Rakove’s blaming on the Supreme Court today’s lack of controlling and persuasive precedent regarding the meaning of the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments and Domestic Emoluments Clauses is, at best, mistaken, and at worst, Orwellian. And let’s not forget that part (albeit, a small part) of the delay was engineered by Professor Rakove and his co-amici filing a brief and then subsequently filing a retraction because their factual claims were not defensible. See Letter from Counsel for the Legal Historians to Judge George B. Daniels, CREW v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 1:17-cv-00458-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2017), ECF No. 96, <https://tinyurl.com/ybd783uf>. 

Finally, Professor Rakove wrote that “All previous presidents had scrupulously adhered to the Emoluments Clauses.” (emphasis added) Really? President George Washington received, accepted, and kept several diplomatic and state gifts from the French ambassador to the United States and from a second French government official. Washington never asked for and he never received consent from Congress. Likewise, President Washington purchased land at auction from the federal government in the new federal capital. All this is well known today, as it was well known in the 1790s. There is no record of any of Washington’s contemporaries—in Congress, in the press, or in private correspondence—including among those in the Anti-Administration congressional faction—suggesting any impropriety, much less a constitutional violation. There is no record of any biographers, public intellectuals, or academics then or since suggesting Washington’s conduct violated either Emoluments Clause. No record until Trump. And then the past had to be written. Why Rakove would be willing to participate in such a history project, only he knows. The rest of us can only guess. 

Seth

PS: Just to be clear: I participated (along with co-amici) in the three Emoluments Clauses cases.

Seth Barrett Tillman, A Response to Professor Jack Rakove,’ New Reform Club (July 16, 2025, 1:42 AM), <https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2025/07/a-response-to-professor-jack-rakove_16.html>; 


Tuesday, July 15, 2025

Must Article III Courts Issue Explanations for their Orders?


 

Extract from: Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship, 224(2) Mil. L. Rev. 481, 502 & n.53 (2016) (peer review), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646888>, <https://tinyurl.com/2p9efyek>. 

 

[Tillman (2016):] “The issuance of opinions by courts is a convention or tradition of the American judicial system, but such opinions are not mandated by the express text of Article III, by any federal statute, or even by any federal judicial decision.53 In short, in the American judicial system, orders are primary, not opinions. [Id. at 502 (footnote omitted).]

[Tillman (2016):] “See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 123, 126 (2000) (The operative legal act performed by a court is the entry of a judgment; an opinion is simply an explanation of reasons for that judgment.); Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 1143, 1161 (2006) (An opinion cannot be central to dispute resolution because there is no requirement that an appellate court issue an opinion, and frequently such courts decide cases without any opinion. (emphasis added)); see also Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1327 (1996) (The President’s ordinary obligation to enforce a judgment extends only to the raw judgment itself: the finding of liability or nonliability and the specification of the remedy. That duty does not impose on the President any requirement in future cases to follow the reasoning that led to the court’s judgment or to extend the principles of that judgment beyond the issues and parties encompassed by it.); id. at 1328 ([T]he issuance of opinions is not an essential aspect of the judicial power.); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 Duke L.J. 1183, 1187–88 (2012) (Suppose President Lincoln and President Nixon both believed the courts got the Constitution wrong. Must they nonetheless honor the courts’ decisions? If so, is any obligation limited to complying with specific orders, as Lincoln famously suggested, or must the executive more broadly follow the doctrines laid down by the courts? (citing Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address) (internal citation omitted)). But compare Lawson & Moore, supra at 1328 n.284 (suggesting that legal requirements that judges give reasons for their conclusions . . . are therefore constitutionally questionable), with Sullivan, supra at 1161 n.90 (explaining that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), federal district courts must explain their decisions when they sit as the trier of fact, such as when a district court hears a case absent a jury). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 43 passim (1993).” [Id. at 502 n.53.

[Tillman (July 15, 2025):] I might add that any duty or aspirational norm regarding a court of record putting forward an opinion or otherwise advancing a reasoned explanation for an order falls heaviest on final judgments, and only to a lesser extent on interim orders prior to a substantive review on the merits. It is not as if every trial court regularly produces (or even could produce) a written explanation in regard to every hearsay or other objection. Frequently, such courts merely rule and do not put forward any reasoning, even orally. And certainly, discovery orders, although sometimes issued as speaking orders, often come absent advancing any rationale for the relief granted and the relief denied. All this is well known to trial court practitioners, even if this issue is left somewhat unclear in academic casebooks reviewing primarily (or, perhaps, only) appellate caselaw.

Seth Barrett Tillman, Must Article III Courts Issue Explanations for their Orders?,’ New Reform Club (July 15, 2025, 3:25 AM), <https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2025/07/must-article-iii-courts-issue.html>; 

Sunday, July 13, 2025

A Lawfare Research Project

 

David L. Noll, Lawfare Research Project 25-4, ‘Civil Contempt Against a Defiant Executive,’ Lawfare (1 July 2025), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=5346771>.

 

Professor Noll wrote:

When Union troops entered the city, they arrested John Merryman, a pro-slavery Democrat who was organizing supporters of the Confederacy, and imprisoned him at Fort McHenry. The army allowed Merryman access to a lawyer. He petitioned Chief Justice Roger Taney, who maintained chambers in Baltimore as circuit justice, for a writ of habeas corpus. [page 31 (footnotes omitted)]

Union Army troops arrested Merryman some twelve days after they entered Baltimore. Merryman did not live in Baltimore—his home was in Cockeysville—some 18 miles from Baltimore. What evidence is there that Taney had chambers in Baltimore? Moreover, it is astonishing that Noll would write that Merryman was “organizing supporters of the Confederacy.” Noll puts forward no evidence in support of that bold, inflated claim. And the authority on which Noll relies (that is, a journal article by Professor Vladeck) makes no such claim. As for counter-evidence, see ‘Merryman, John, of Hayfields,’ in 1 The Biographical Cyclopedia of Representative Men of Maryland and District of Columbia 312 (Baltimore, National Biographical Publishing Company 1879) (explaining that shortly before Merryman’s seizure by the U.S. Army, Merryman “was introduced to [U.S.] Major Belger, and offered to render him or the [Union] troops any service required; and if necessary would slaughter his [Merryman's] cattle to supply the[] [Union troops] with food”). I certainly hope that Noll is not relying on the governments indictment. An indictment is only a mere accusation; it is not evidence of guilt. That is blackletter law. 

 

Seth Barrett Tillman, ‘A Lawfare Research Project,’ New Reform Club (July 13, 2025, 6:12 AM), <https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2025/07/a-lawfare-research-project.html>;

See also: Seth Barrett Tillman, What Court (if any) Decided Ex parte Merryman?—A Correction for Justice Sotomayor (and others), 13(1) Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies 43–65 (2024) (peer review), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=4157572>; 

and, 

Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship, 224(2) Mil. L. Rev. 481–540 (2016) (peer review), <https://tinyurl.com/2p9efyek>, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646888>.

Thursday, July 10, 2025

The Things You Find When Visiting A Library With An Older Collection of Books on U.S. History

An Elector, To the Free Electors of this Town, Boston 1788, in 2 Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz, American Political Writing During the Founding Era 17601805, at 70506 (1983) (describing electioneering as a corrupt practice);

1 Joseph L. Blau & Salo W. Baron, The Jews of the United States 17901840, at 28 (1963) (One article [of the North Carolina Constitution of 1776] granted complete freedom of religion; another required al state officials to be theists and Protestants and to accept the divine authority of both Old and New Testaments. As a Jew, Jacob Henry could not conscientiously conform to the latter provision.); 

15 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution / Public and Private / 18 December 1787 to 31 January 1788 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds. 1984):

The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents, at 15 DHRC 13, 29 (explaining that a quorum of the Senate is 14, and a treaty may be assented to by the Senate by 10 members, that is 2/3 of a quorum); 

Luther Martin, Genuine Information V(BaltimoreMaryland Gazette, 8 January 1788) 15 DHRC 348, 35152 (expounding on the history of the draft Ineligibility Clause); id. at 352 (And as the system is now reported, the president having the power to nominate to all offices . . . .” (italics in the original)); 

Seth Barrett Tillman, The Things You Find When Visiting A Library With An Older Collection of Books on U.S. History, New Reform Club (July 10, 2025, 8:55 AM), <https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2025/07/the-things-you-find-when-visiting.html>;