I looked in on the comments to an earlier post and saw the argument over the existence of morality as more than a subjective being discussed. We've been over this territory, but I think a twist is possible.
This time we'll put the burden on the relativists (or whatever they want to be called): please give your evidence that there is no absolute right or wrong.
59 comments:
Sorry, Hunter, that's a tautology stretched too taut. Since there is no right or wrong, evidence is impossible. Thus the premise is inherently unprovable.
However, the inverse is possible. The fact that the mind sees right and wrong constantly (it is right to put one foot in front of the other if one wishes to transport oneself in a forward direction) proves that right and wrong exists.
Jay, with all respect to your linguistic prestidigitation, that's the most ridiculous semantic argument I have ever read. I can only hope that it was tongue-in-cheek. Or are you actually conflating a mode of travel with a moral/ethical choice?
James, LA, Tlaloc, I want you to really take the burden of giving evidence for this point of view. Try to really spell it out. Jay may be right or wrong, but I want to hear from you why you embrace the viewpoint you do.
The basic request again is, "Please give evidence for the belief that there is no such thing as true right or wrong, particularly as regards moral values."
Looks like it gets a lot tougher when the shoe is on the other foot. Not getting a lot of takers to give evidence for the resolution offered.
I have tried to find where the "road forks" between the relativist and the absolutist. Forgive me if this is old hat for some of you.
Here is what I see as agreement between the MR's and MA's:
- both use many factors, internal and external, to make a decision and take action;
- morality is one of the internal factors;
Where MR's and MA's split:
- morality, one of the inputs to the decision making process, is either:
MR: different for different people;
MA: universal (absolute).
Have I framed this correctly? Am I close?
I think you've stated the situation fairly. We need some of our hard-core relativists to chime in and move this thing along. I'm starting to think they don't want to tackle this problem.
So sorry. My new "no blogging from home" policy (lest my fiancee leave me for not paying attention to her) and a busy work schedule today will preclude my involvement in more than spurts. More later. Of course, feel free to interpret this as grounds for unwarranted triumphalism (to use your words) if that makes you feel better.
Of course, as framed you're asking us to prove a negative.
If one were to say, "God does not exist", another can ask him "have you looked everywhere?"
Of course it is impossible to look everywhere, and if one COULD look everywhere, that person would be God himself.
Along similar lines as James, I wish this thread were started on a Monday or Tuesday rather than on Friday.
Consider the pragmatism of Aristotle and the skepticism of the Greek Cynics. Aristotle would have us focus on what virtues need to be taught. The Cynic would wisely point out that were a virtue absolute, a Grand Truth per se, it would not need to be taught. Morals are an aspect of communitarian living. Even Aristotle wrote that ethics (i.e. morals) are an aspect of (social) politics, rather than metaphysics.
As has been painstakingly pointed out in this forum before, all cultures will choose to focus on different virtues (which are by necessity described and determined in a confluence of linguistics, religion, and socio-cultural factors).
So, while one might say, "Killing is wrong!" another will say "Ah, but we must stone to death those guilty of adultery!" And indeed, even in those societies that say killing is wrong, caveats will be placed on such a stricture. In war, we permit grave crimes (such as murder) and laud them as acts of heroism whereas a sane, rational response (Run away from the men with guns!) is vilified and punished by death. We go on to permit the state to commit crimes (such as murder) so long as it meets some sort of arbitrarily (no matter how rationally) arrived at code of reasoning. Oh, but you can kill in defense of home, of self, of another... Soon it becomes an exercise in semantics. How we define such acts becomes more important than the act itself.
Other examples: Ruthless abandon that is acceptable in frontier settlement (such as the slaughter of Natives or the hoarding of resources) becomes unacceptable once the frontier reaches a threshold of civilization. Is a Fundamentalist Muslim less moral because he believes a sexually-active single woman should be killed while a modern Christian does not (though he or she may condemn the woman's actions)?
Is something a truth when we keep coming up with exceptions to it? Do we look to history for the answers, finding virtue in traditions when such traditions are often constructed around the power structures of the time? To bastardize a bit of Aristotle: The history of man is mired in the politics of man.
You can come up with any form of moral judgment and someone will be able to come up with a hypothetical or real world example that puts the lie to it. If something were absolute (to play the same semantic game indemic to such discussions), then it should be impossible to do so. In order to say something is an absolute truth, you have to say that someone is acting contrarily to it by some aspect of their own volition, explainable only by some sort of pathology (Man is wicked, man is tainted by original sin, etc.). Ultimately, you have to ask who is defining that ultimate truth, and how are they defining it? Invariably that "truth" is a sociocultural linguistic construction, no matter the use of logic or reason (nothing is purely objective where the human mind is involved). Such constructs evolve, unravel, and reconstitute themselves over the scale of time.
You cannot speak to grand moral truths because they are constantly evolving due to situation, culture, language, religion, and plain old human experience and perceptions.
And that's my lunch break. I'll try to check in later.
If one were to say, "God does not exist", another can ask him "have you looked everywhere?"
Which is why I'm an agnostic who leans towards atheism. I could be wrong. I don't think I am, but I allow for the possibility. I just think the sociocultural, anthropoligical, and historical advantages of religion explain its existence a whole lot better than some Dude in the sky with a magic teddy bear who creates reality with grand pronouncements. Or something.
No, really, I HAVE to get this report done. I'm out. (Riiight...)
James, thanks for throwing some stuff out there to see if it will stick. I expect this board will start seeing some action, from me if from no one else.
James, Re: "Killing is wrong."
If someone dies in a battle (in a war), was that person killed or murdered? Is there a difference (to you)? Does it matter?
You are also confusing our societies rules (you can kill in defense of your home) with a moral rule.
The moral rule would be:
We ought not intentionally kill another human being.
I realize that you may be too busy to be as articulate as you'd like; please do not take offense if I am reading too much into your choice of words.
No offense taken, CLA. I finished my report and have a few minutes before my next meeting, so I'll address your point (probably too briefly).
In a nutshell, yes, you are reading too much into it, but then, I didn't define my terms as clearly as I perhaps needed to. This is always a problem in debates on morals, ethics, and philosophy, since they are so reliant upon linguistic construction, and I should be more diligent about it!
I guess I would object to your categorizing societal rules as not being moral rules. I don't think you can separate the two quite so readily, since society's rules (i.e. man's laws) have an underpinning in the drafters' morality. We would quite simply look less askance upon someone who killed in what met society's definition of self-defense than we would one who killed in the course of what society has labeled a crime.
We ought not intentionally kill another human being.
War still remains a sticking point here. We (society) are instructing members to go and intentionally kill another human being with a moral sanction (You're on the side of God, Freedom, Liberty, Mom and Apple Pie, etc.). Society continually creates exceptions and caveats to so-called absolute rules. So the question remains: How can something we continually redefine remain absolute?
Thanks for the thoughtful feedback. And if someone "sees" Matt Huisman, tell him that he can find an answer to his final question in the "Commander-in-Chief" thread in Liberal Anonymous's first post on this thread. Thanks.
I guess I would object to your categorizing societal rules as not being moral rules.
You've just supplied me with an AHA! moment!
I may be wrong, but I believe an absolutist would state that morals, because they are universal, are not dependent upon society.
The converse, that society is dependent upon morals, is a different story.
That may be it for me! Got guests coming and I need a haircut ... something that both relativists and absolutists would probably agree on.
I may be wrong, but I believe an absolutist would state that morals, because they are universal, are not dependent upon society.
Your "AHA!" moment might illustrate the crucial difference. Correct me if I'm wrong in summing this up:
Relativist: It is impossible for morals to exist outside of human perceptions and society.
Absolutist: It is impossible for human perceptions and society to exist outside of morals.
Does that sound about right? There would seem to be a fundamental, foundational disconnect. That would make reconciliation (and, indeed, mutual understanding!) very difficult.
Let me give the evidence as I see it. I'll try to state what I think is the primary disconnect.
The primary evidence for the existence of moral absolutes is that people everywhere and at all times live under rules and principles. Those principles and rules would yield certain core truths that I think can be found and identified again and again.
Example: I seriously doubt the existence of a society where theft undertaken for profit rather than need would ever be applauded.
Example: I doubt the existence of a society where someone considered a friend regularly lies to you with damaging consequences.
Example: I doubt the existence of a society where killing is accepted or applauded without a strong justification like self-defense or punishment of a crime.
I think that I could make the challenge based on these or other principles and no one could identify a society that has held the opposite.
I think the fact of the matter is that it is probably indisputable that there is a core of always there taboos and praiseworthy acts. Realistically, I think the debate could only be at the margins of how expansive such principles might be.
LA, name the societies that prove I'm wrong about the other rules, because I can't think of them.
As to the other point, about individuals who apparently feel none of the force of these prohibitions, we can simply say that they are either handicapped (mentally ill) or that they chose to do what they thought was wrong in service of some other desire like personal enrichment, rage, etc.
If everyone observed these rules, we'd be living in little utopias. I said we're aware of them and are willing to legislate them, not that we always follow them.
The rap culture is entertainment based and thrives on doing what is understood to be wrong. It's not a nullification, it's a set of choices based on what is understood to be right.
Second, would you or anyone anywhere think it was right if you took a test and the teacher randomly assigned a grade or failed you without reason. Virtually impossible to imagine.
Finally, can you or any other human being with the capacity of reason distinguish these two statements:
1. Chocolate ice cream is better than vanilla ice cream.
2. It is better to care for babies than to abuse them.
Anyone equipped with reason can see the first is a mere statement of preference, while the second identifies a human truth.
(Taking advantage of my fiancee's brief absence.)
Hunter, it would appear that you are identifying survival traits (you know, evolutionary advantages?) as moral truths.
Man is naturally a social creature, incapable of reliably surviving on its own. This would necessitate a prediliction towards communal harmony as much as possible (the American Mythos of the lone settler family eking a solitary existence is a load of horse-hockey). This is a political (in the social sense), not metaphysical, point. Aristotle all over again.
As for your "abusing babies" point: The Huns would malform their male babies and abuse them in order to make them more physically and psychologically imposing to their enemies as adults. This was morally correct in their world, since they were a warrior culture that relied as much upon fear as martial prowess to win victories (in order to survive and thrive). The child abuse was, according to their culture, a wholly moral act because it improved the child's survivability and therefore their success as a tribe.
The fundamental divide here is that no one can divorce themselves from their foundational beliefs. You can no more divorce yourself from the foundation of your belief in God and his Word than I can my skepticism. This is the advantage of relativism: It accepts the natural subjectivity of all human thought. For all our pretenses at rationality and logic, nothing is arrived at via pure reason when you are discussing human matters. It's the great conceit of philosophy.
James, I'm divided in my response to you because I struggle with the natural law. Believing in God is not necessarily part of it. My Christian impulse is to say the natural law does not exist and we only have revelation. My reason tells me the natural law does exist and I can rationally get around it. Interesting, huh?
The thing about the Huns is that they do what they do with a justification. That indicates that what they do would be immoral without that justification.
Another thing, James. The point you made about survival values is really part of conservative philosophy. Remember, the conservative movement is not made up only of sincere believers. Many take up God as the "noble lie" and view values as having arisen in an evolutionary fashion. We stay with them because they are proven and have stood the test of time. That's still something you'll hear from someone like Tony Snow.
Clarification: I'm not saying Tony Snow embraces the noble lie idea of God, but he does explain values in the "we have learned over time that these work" fashion.
I guess you'll have to prove how such traditions and morals are "common" and will then have to prove how such a thing makes them "universal." I don't believe you can.
The religion thing was just an example of how objectivity in regards to human relations is impossible. Subjectivity means that human thought (i.e. morals) is relative.
The thing about the Huns is that they do what they do with a justification. That indicates that what they do would be immoral without that justification.
That's a patently ridiculous statement that you can't come close to proving. What moral doesn't have some form of justification?
I really get the feeling that you've read what I've written without making an attempt to understand. I've addressed the pathologizing of "immoral" individuals and exceptions to moral rules (i.e. "noble lies") and how they make a case for moral relativity, and you just kind of barrel ahead with the same old arguments without bothering to refute or address their counters.
James, I am paying attention to what you say. You think that exceptions, carve-outs, justifications, etc. indicate there isn't some kind of absolute moral law. I'm saying that the instinct to justify, the need to explain or give some sort of reason for a different behavior shows that the moral law is there and divergences from it require an explanation.
Pay attention. I'm not saying any justification behind a moral establishes an absolute moral law's existence. I'm saying that the Huns in your scenario would justify the harsh treatment of the young men as helping to fit them for existence in a harsh world. The need to justify the harsh treatment indicates that gentle treatment is the norm. Thus, gentle treatment of the young in one's care might be part of the natural law.
I think where you're getting confused is thinking that my explanations for WHY the Huns' actions were moral in their culture are the same thing as a justification WITHIN their culture. It's not. You're presuming a sense of guilt on some level ("I am sorry, my son, but I must do this so you can be strong and survive).
Here was the quote:
"The child abuse was, according to their culture, a wholly moral act because it improved the child's survivability and therefore their success as a tribe."
It seems as though their culture justified the harsh treatment because of the aid to survival. We're left with a factual question as to whether they felt any need to justify the harsh treatment. My guess is that if I journeyed back in time and was able to question them, they would justify it to me rather than acting as if I were insane. But I can't be sure.
Build me a time travel machine and I'll go check it out. NOT the one Uncle Rico ordered on the internet, though, please.
If a house is on fire and there are people trapped inside, do you try to save them?
This poses a dilemma. My survival instinct tells me no way, while my herd instinct tells me to go in and get 'em.
How do I decide between the two?
If I *don't* go in and all inside perish, do I feel bad; do I *wish* that I could've done something?
Hunter has posed the following:
1) a universal moral law exists;
2) all people feel inside that they ought to follow it;
3) those who do not follow it always justify thier immoral acts.
Then he states that if the act was NOT immoral there would be no need for justification.
I have yet to see a counter argument from a relativist.
That's because we have lives and are busy. Besides, the only one taking this up consistently is me, and I'm a moderately well-read amateur. Don't expect anything definitive. I'm busy.
James ... thanks for all of the thoughtful commentary that you have provided. If nothing else I will come away from this discussion having learned a little bit more about the thought process of a relativist; and knowing that a controverial subject like this can be discussed (or argued) in an adult-like manner.
Thanks...
If we limit ourselves to viewing the actions of others, the only logical conclusion would be that there are NO moral values at all.
You have stated clearly that you do not even follow *your* moral code.
How do I even know that you have morals; I guess I have to assume that you are telling me the truth.
Tlaloc, good to "see" you. Excellent summation.
I agree with what Tlaloc has said (especially since we've both pointed out the variation of morals due to linguistic and cultural construction and the effects of time). I'll throw in my last two cents on this subject and then go give my brain a rest.
CLA and Hunter have posited, in the manner of the Greek Stoics and the Medieval Scholastics (such as St. Thomas Aquinas) that a Natural Law exists. This Natural Law is either encoded in nature or handed down from God (depending on who you listen to - the origin does not matter too much in this context). Hunter has argued that this Natural Law is in effect the survival traits encoded in us that benefit the species and that acting contrary to them requires some form of justification in order to alleviate guilt.
Survival traits are encoded in two ways: genetic predispositions such as reacting to the cries of a child in distress, or learned behaviors. In humans, the latter is expressed as rules for social living and so on.
This view is brought into question when faced with a moral dilemma such as the one CLA proposed above. When faced with two equally important survival traits, how do we decide which is the more important? It becomes a personal, subjective decision.
If such morals are "natural," then we would expect to see them encoded in all creatures, not just humans. But what about the creatures that eat their young or kill the young of opposing males? Do animals make moral choices? No. As Tlaloc pointed out, they are amoral. Morality is a construct unique to human consciousness.
Suppose morals are unique to humans, but still these natural laws? In order for this to be true, then people must basically be good (a la Rousseau's "noble savage") and, in order for Hobbes to be correct that people are basically bad (and I know how much y'all love Hobbes), people must then consciously choose to be bad. But we know Hobbes is incorrect because tribes of both humans and genetic ancestors, like apes, live in harmony without recourse to "social contracts."
But we also know that Rousseau is incorrect, otherwise people then must wander about in paroxysms of guilt, because we know that they are both generous and selfish and to choose a selfish act is contrary to a universal morality. However, we also know that they are often so without remorse (see Kropotkin or Wilson). Remorse requires some form of justification, and as any criminal, selfish person, or six-year old can tell you, sometimes there isn't any. Humans are neither engines of remorseless greed nor are they pure innocents corrupted by any number of ills (civilization, original sin, blah de blah blah). People can both be generous friends and selfish individuals.
In order for Hunter's interpretation to take wing, all immoral acts require a justification. But we know that there are people and societies who have acted without remorse or justification. By necessity, then, for Hunter's theory to play out, we must pathologize these amoral actors, or concede that man is little more than an animal. Since the latter is patently not so, we must rely upon pathology. Pathologies, however, are subjective and cultural constructs (I submit the pahtologizing and de-pathologizing of homosexuality as one example). To refute this, exceptions must be created, and you run into the "caveat" problem I explained above.
Genetics is not predestination. while there may be a genetic foundation to our moral activity, such activity can be conflicting as our "social gene" conflicts with our "selfish gene." Just the casual observation shows that humans are not the perfect social animals that bees and ants are. We come in to conflict, and so must construct rules and customs for living together. Our consciousness, our freedom, makes us different from the animals.
What Hunter is suggesting is that an ecosystem - man living by rules that keep his existence in harmony with his surroundings - is tantamount to a universal moral law. For that to be true, it must follow that animals and plants, who also exist in ecosystems, to be moral. However, animals often act in what we would consider immoral fashion without recourse to guilt or justification. We are not animals, having the ability to override instinctual behavior. Our morality is not limited to instinctive displays of passification to aggressors or instinctive patterns of harmonious living. Therefore morality is a human construct, an artifact of culture, custom, linguistics and linguistics. All of these factors evolve and change over time.
If morality is a human construct, it is prone to the same influences of subjectivity and historical construction as all other human enterprises. As those influences evolve, so too will morality.
If we limit ourselves to viewing the actions of others, the only logical conclusion would be that there are NO moral values at all.
This is hardly true. We can only logically conclude that there are many types of morality, and many of them are contrary and many of them are complementary.
CLA, you are attempting to devolve moral relativism into some form of solipsism. That was tried by Homnick, and to as little effect. If that is the grand extent of your refutation, I'm afraid it falls short. Tlaloc is merely demonstrating the greatest lesson of Socrates: Know thyself. After all, to look at it from your side of the argument, didn't Socrates say that such was the essence of coming to know any greater truths?
Let me make my statement again:
If you are limited to viewing the actions of others (ie, do not look inside ones-self) you must conclude that there are no morals.
This is simlpy because all types of human behaviour, or specifically human interaction, exist.
In other words, you will always be able to find a counter argument for any so-called moral.
What is the point of any argument being called moral at all, if we cannot come to an agreement as to what moral means?
I feel guilty when I ride the elevator up one floor, are you suggesting that I am acting amoral, that I am breaking my own moral law?
I am certainly not trying to be cute, I am trying to understand what it is that you are calling moral; what specifically makes an action fall under the umbrella of morals.
I apologize if this has been defined and I somehow missed it; like the rest of you I have other obligations other than RCing.
"If you really feel that it is wrong to ride the elevator then you are acting immorally, not amorally. Amoral means without morals at all. Immoral means having morals and not acting in accordance with them."
Thanks for the correction; you answered the question that I meant to ask.
Just to try to briefly cut through, I think the key question is whether we can find ANY common themes in these endless individual moralities of which you speak, although I think it would be better to speak of community moralities because a unique individual code is probably pretty rare.
If we can identify strong commonalities and justifications for the things that diverge from commonalities, then I would argue we have identified something like a natural moral law.
Plants, animals, etc. are excluding because the natural law is a function of reasoning creatures who give reasons for their choices and conduct.
The reason I am trying to get a better understanding of what moral means is because I think I am getting a redundant argument from the relativists.
Please bear with me:
We have heard from relativists that morals are individual, and they are based upon society, surroundings, life experiences (etc...I may not have that exactly right, but its close I believe).
James Elliot: "A disciplined, rigorous relativist (such as I am trying to become) is still free to say there is a right or a wrong. What I must understand is that I am projecting my internal processes when I do so, processes that are influenced by (but not limited to) personal ethics, morals, society, culture, and maybe religion (though not in my personal case)."
My point? If morals are an end result of ones society, surroundings etc..., why even claim that you are influenced by morals?
For example, if you look on the ingredient list of, say, chocolate chip cookies and it says:
Flour, sugar, eggs, baking powder, cookie dough, and chocolate chips,
Why put the "cookie dough" in the ingredient list if it consists entirely of the "other ingredients"?
"The Aztecs had mass human sacrifices in a manner we find barbaric in extremus."
Is this really a difference of moral principle or is this a case where a culture did not understand certain matters of fact? My understanding is that the Aztecs believed they needed these sacrifices in order to keep the earth spinning and the sun rising (or something like that).
I don't see this as an exception to the law of human nature...this looks like a case of morality gone bad due to a serious misunderstanding of reality.
"But you want to maintain that our version of reality is superior. Can't you see how that is an explicitly egocentric evaluation?"
I didn't say anything about their version of reality being better/worse than ours. I said that the difference between their behavior and ours was explained by a misunderstanding of fact. If you and I believed that mass sacrifice was absolutely required in order to keep the sun rising and the earth spinning, our moral response (the thing we ought to do) would probably look very similar to theirs.
I'm arguing that the Aztec example is not evidence of wildly different morals between societies...if we would do the same thing in their situation, that's hardly a difference.
"1) does morality exist? Yes, I know it exists because I have a moral code which inhibits me from certain actions. Morality is a function of higher (sentient) thought which is self evaluating. It only exists within such frameworks of sentience. Inanimate objects or simple life forms are themselves amoral."
So then you would more or less agree with the statement that behavior is the outcome of the interplay between desires and values/beliefs, and that moral behavior occurs when our actions are in alignment with these values.
"Morality most likely develops much as any personality: as a combination of individual nature, biological make up, and personal experience including social influences."
This implies that while there certainly are external influences on our morality, there is something already in (or pressing on) us that says things ought to be a certain way.
I can understand the source of our desires, but in order for us to evaluate/reflect on them, it seems like there needs to be a standard that we are comparing our desires against...and it looks like that standard can't be entirely explained by outside influences.
I guess I have trouble understanding where these values/beliefs come from if they are separate from our desires and are not (entirely) the result of external influences.
If you and I believed that mass sacrifice was absolutely required in order to keep the sun rising and the earth spinning, our moral response (the thing we ought to do) would probably look very similar to theirs.
So let me get this straight, Huisman: You're arguing that people will change their moral responses based on their cultural understanding of reality?
How is this not moral relativity?
Or are you arguing that people's responses to moral imperatives (whatever those imperatives are) argue for a universal morality? I'm having trouble seeing the flow of that logic.
I guess I have trouble understanding where these values/beliefs come from if they are separate from our desires and are not (entirely) the result of external influences.
Behavior is a complex thing. Behavior stems from complex schema we develop. We learn these schema from our experiences, our culture, parental uprbringing, experiences, and our perceptions of these experiences. Schema can be modified as further experiences are assimilated. These schema interact with genetically encoded physiological response patterns.
Nothing says that something internal doesn't play some sort of role. But by interacting with the outside world, which varies in both occurence and perception from individual to individual, behavior, beliefs, and values will vary from person to person.
Matt ... you're right on target. If you believed that a witch was going to kill you and then eat you, you'd kill the witch (or burn it).
If you believed the intruder into your home was going to kill you, you might try to kill the intruder.
These situations do not contradict the basic universal moral code that we ought not intentionally take the life of another human being.
"Were morals really intransient then we should not be able to swap out our godly righteous civilization with that godless pagan civilization and have people behave the same. And yet we most certainly would."
You are arguing my point. I state that all people are subject to the same natural law, therefore, different people will reference the same standard and (if they are acting in alignment with their values) respond similarly.
Hunter said...
"If we can identify strong commonalities and justifications for the things that diverge from commonalities, then I would argue we have identified something like a natural moral law.
As part of one of your responses, you offered the Aztecs as an example of a society with a radically different set of morals than ours. My point is that the Aztect moral code, when you allow for a mistake in fact, appears to be similar to our moral code.
Maybe you could provide some other examples of societies with wildly divergent moralities.
"Your example doesn't even work since in both cases you give you do advocate killing given the circumstances. Someone who truly believed your "universal moral" would be an absolute pacifist like the Jains."
I'm saying that there is a difference between our desires/impulses and the justification for choosing to act on them. Our impulses (sex, killing, patriotism, etc.) are value-neutral. The moral law tells us how to act when our impulses compete with one another.
Matt, that doesn't even follow in a remotely logical fashion. You were arguing Tlaloc's point. You argued that the Aztec's actions made sense from their cultural perspective. You then say that because people in the same cultural milieus act similarly, that proves a universal moral standard. That doesn't flow logically. You modified what you said previously.
You can't move the goal posts just become someone scores against you, man.
My point is that the Aztect moral code, when you allow for a mistake in fact, appears to be similar to our moral code.
You're really going to have to explain what you mean by that. Are you arguing that, say, Aztecs who sacrificed people to keep the Earth in balance and Krakatoans who sacrificed virgins to appease volcanoes were operating on essentially the same moral function? In effect, you are arguing that actions make the morals. You're taking similar responses given moderately similar metaphysical beliefs and making a side-by-side comparison. That's ridiculous.
I'm saying that there is a difference between our desires/impulses and the justification for choosing to act on them. Our impulses (sex, killing, patriotism, etc.) are value-neutral. The moral law tells us how to act when our impulses compete with one another.
You (and the others) keep returning to this point without addressing the difficulties in pathologizing and justifications that have been articulated above. Rather than refute said difficulties, you choose to keep running in to them. Essentially, "justification" is a straw man; it's a construction that allows you to "refute" counterexamples in a semantic rather than logical fashion. All morals are a justification of action or inaction, Matt, and can be parsed multiple ways.
"Matt, that doesn't even follow in a remotely logical fashion. You were arguing Tlaloc's point. You argued that the Aztec's actions made sense from their cultural perspective. You then say that because people in the same cultural milieus act similarly, that proves a universal moral standard. That doesn't flow logically. You modified what you said previously.
You can't move the goal posts just become someone scores against you, man."
I'll try again...I don't know if I moved the goal posts, but I think I let the analogy get away from me.
I'm saying that there is a law of human nature (natural law) that all people reference in order to make morally justified behavioral choices. The behavioral choices themselves are value-neutral (ie killing is not always wrong).
Now, what's interesting is that when questioned about their behavior, people will justify it by referencing moral principles that look remarkably similar from once society to the next.
In the Aztec example, they justify mass sacrifice by stating that it was required in order to satisfy the moral principle of caring for/preserving the planet. I'm saying that this moral principle that they reference is timeless and universal. And if the facts were that the earth was going to come to an end tomorrow, and we had reliable* info that the only* way to stop it was to commit mass sacrifice, then morally we should do it.
(* There are all kinds of reasons for saying that the Aztecs were acting immorally here, but I'm trying to keep the variables to a minimum.)
Now my observation from all of this is that all societies seem to justify their behavior against a remarkably similar set of moral principles. They may not make good choices because they are based on unreliable information or because people are being dishonest in their application, but the principles referenced still seem very much the same.
Matt, that explains it much better. Thank you for the clarification. I still believe you are wrong, but now I at least have a clearer picture.
Now my observation from all of this is that all societies seem to justify their behavior against a remarkably similar set of moral principles.
However, you are defining those "remarkably similar" principals from your own sociocultural perspective. This subjectivity is what relativism is all about.
The essential reduction of the absolutist arguments presented here hinges on the existence of innate survival-based responses, as expressed through human behavior. Culture is, after all, an aspect of human behavior, if a cooperative one, and one that creates a feedback loop. You are arguing that because all humans, just like all animals, want to survive, and come up with conscious explanations and fabrications to excuse that behavior - whatever said behavior is - that argues for a universal moral law.
I believe we've addressed the difficulties of elevating evolutionary survival traits to the status of morals above.
"However, you are defining those "remarkably similar" principals from your own sociocultural perspective. This subjectivity is what relativism is all about."
"You are arguing that because all humans, just like all animals, want to survive, and come up with conscious explanations and fabrications to excuse that behavior - whatever said behavior is - that argues for a universal moral law."
I think it's about time we left the Aztec example behind, because it confuses evolutionary survival issues with what we're trying to talk about.
I had earlier asked Tlaloc for examples of divergent morals from other societies, and he provided several. The Roma example he mentioned interests me, but I'm afraid I have a limited understanding of their society. I assume the point here is going to be that they believed that subsistance stealing was OK?
Maybe someone could elaborate on this a little more for me.
"My understanding of traditional Roma culture is that they considered a person to own a thing only if they were actively using it at the time."
So within their own society, they were communal. Everyone understood that property belonged to the entire group. This would certainly not violate the moral principle of not taking someone else's property without permission, it would merely render it useless.
"Their view of property is part of what lead to them being associated with theivery by other groups because they acted according to their moral code."
If the property was not theirs, then it was not theivery.
Matt is right ... their society rendered this particular part of the universal moral code useless (at least thats what I think Matt was saying).
Matt is right ... their society rendered this particular part of the universal moral code useless (at least thats what I think Matt was saying).
You're moving the goal posts again, folks. Now you're taking a contrary example and claiming that it simply disregards "natural law" instead of refuting it. As pointed out before, now the debate dissolves into semantics, and once you've done that, it's all... wait for it... relative.
"You're moving the goal posts again, folks. Now you're taking a contrary example and claiming that it simply disregards "natural law" instead of refuting it. As pointed out before, now the debate dissolves into semantics, and once you've done that, it's all... wait for it... relative.
Capitalism, communism, socialism are examples of morally neutral structures that societies choose to organize themselves in. We may prefer one to the others because of the way that people tend to react in these systems, but in and of themselves they are not good/bad.
Within their society, the Roma had explicit permission to take each other's property. Therefore, they had virtually eliminated the chance to violate the natural law of taking someone's property without permission. But that isn't evidence of a society not acknowledging the existence of the natural law.
I don't think you can flag me for moving the posts this time, James. [Although, I did enjoy your pause for dramatic effect at the end.]
"Behavior is a complex thing. Behavior stems from complex schema we develop. We learn these schema from our experiences, our culture, parental uprbringing, experiences, and our perceptions of these experiences. Schema can be modified as further experiences are assimilated. These schema interact with genetically encoded physiological response patterns."
Obviously I agree with you that behavior is complex, and external influences are very significant. But let's try to break it down...
Behavior is the action a person chooses after comparing their desires/impulses against a value/belief structure in response to external stimuli. I would tend to view your notion of 'genetically encoded physiological response patterns' and equate that to my notion of desires/impulses. But what is the origin of the value/belief structure? Is it entirely the result of external influences? Or is it more likely that those influences have helped strengthen, develop and shape (or the opposite) something that was already there?
Behavior is the action a person chooses after comparing their desires/impulses against a value/belief structure in response to external stimuli.
Um, actually, no, it's not. Behavior is a series of conscious and unconscious reactions to stimuli. Some of this behavior is instinctual, but more often it is ingrained learned behavior resulting from experiences with past stimuli.
I'd like to take a moment to point out that I am a member of the California Association for Behavior Analysis. Behaviorism was, for several years, a part of my work and is now a big part of my intellectual interests.
Of course, I'm just being semantic. I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and just place "moral" in front of "behavior."
In answer to your question, I am wholly convinced that value/belief structures are external impositions. Some morals may be the conscious expression of instinctive behavior patterns, but certainly not all. I believe that in order to essentially prove a "natural law" you have to engage in a massively reductionist argument. And I think I'm done. It was a very stimulating and respectful conversation that I enjoyed immensely. Thank you for all your input. It certainly forced me to think hard and to consider ideas I had glossed over previously.
No, I get it, I was just avoiding it because I don't have access to the relevant facts.
I question the honesty (the Roma's, not yours) of their belief that property belongs to everyone. It's one thing to live communally, and to agree to share all property. It's quite another to believe that property belongs to everyone when outsiders have explicitly shown that they do not agree.
One has to wonder what their reaction would be to an outsider taking away all of their possessions, or kidnapping family members. Any surprise or outrage would betray their 'principle' of communal property. (Go to a communal society like JPUSA sometime and walk out of a room with a pair of shoes, and the first thing you'll here as you're walking down the hall is "Dude, those are MY shoes!") I would also add that the Roma's use of deceitful tactics in order to obtain someone else's property does not exactly inspire thoughts of moral integrity either.
If you want to argue that outside oppression (and from the little I know, it was significant) forced them into a life of 'subsistence stealing', that would be different. But it would also be an acknowledgement that taking property without permission is stealing, and is only justified by extreme circumstances.
"there's not much I can do if everytime I show you an example of other belief systems you just assume they are lying.
I agree. I don't believe that I'm wrong, but I'm just wasting your time if I can't provide you with more than my speculation. The only readings (a handful of articles) I've seen justify Roma behavior as 'subsistance stealing', but its hard for me to know if they're capturing the real morality of the people or just 'making an excuse' for their behavior. [I would be interested in looking at any articles about them that address this issue, if you would care to point me to them.]
"As I see it there are far far too many cases (including cases where the lie would have had to have been planned out decades before contact with westerners) in the world of alternate moral view points exemplified by cultures for this to be the case."
I don't know...I think people are exceptionally good at lying to themselves. Especially when the lie projects out or justifies their behavior relative to someone else. But the genius behind the golden rule (do unto others...) is that when the circumstances are reversed, we get a better picture of what a person truly believes.
---
FYI, I'm happy to keep going with you here Tlaloc, but it looks like its only you and me here now, and we're still argueing whether their are moral commonalities between societies. We haven't even discussed whether or not it would be significant if there were.
If you want to pull the plug, let me know.
Post a Comment