United States Constitution Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 reads:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of
a Bill.
Madison, in his Notes on the
Debates in the Federal Convention (Aug. 15 & Aug. 16, 1787),
suggested it meant the following:
Every [bill by whatever name Congress calls it] to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
[because it has legislative effect] (except on a question of Adjournment) shall
be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall
take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be
repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to
the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of [other] Bill[s] [properly
stylized when enacted per U.S. Const.
art. I, § 7, cl. 2]. [1]
Thus, this clause is usually
called: the Presentment of Resolutions Clause, the Second Presentment Clause, or the Residual Presentment Clause: it ensures presentment of bill-substitutes to the President in
spite of feared Madisonian legislative legerdemain attempting to manipulatively
bypass the President’s veto,[2] which is already provided
for in the prior clause. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2
(the Presentment or Veto Clause).
I have good reason to believe Madison erred, or, more likely,
modern courts and commentators have seriously misunderstood Madison’s Notes.
In a 2005 article in Texas Law Review, I put forward the
view of a Commonwealth parliamentarian with whom I corresponded on this
question. He is now, most unfortunately, deceased, but he was very well informed with regard to eighteenth century British
and colonial parliamentary and administrative (treasury) practices. Indeed, my 2005 research relied extensively on contacts with foreign parliamentary officers, and
legislative clerks & secretaries.
Every [final] Order, Resolution, or Vote [of a single house of
Congress] to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives
may be necessary [as prior statutory authorization] (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect [as a regulation per the prior organic act],
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill [which is a different case].
This (proposed) new meaning for Clause 3 stands our separation of
powers jurisprudence on its head. It means the Supreme Court’s opinion in INS v. Chadha[3]—broadly speaking—was
fundamentally misconceived.
Presentment is always necessary, but not bicameralism. As a matter of original public meaning, Clause 3 permits opting out of bicameralism. Congress may opt out of bicameralism where a single house order is first authorized by a prior statute. That single-house order (resolution or vote) has to be (separately) presented to the President (just like a statute), but such a single-house order need not go through bicameralism if it was authorized by a prior statute. Of course, at a deeper
level, it means that our interpretive community—judges, legal academics,
academics in related fields (government, political science, history, etc), and
lawyers generally—have forgotten what a clause of the Constitution meant.
To put it in its most simple terms, legislative vetoes and line item vetoes are constitutional: as a matter of original public meaning. (For what it is worth, since publication, my 2005 paper has been cited more than 50 times.)
To put it in its most simple terms, legislative vetoes and line item vetoes are constitutional: as a matter of original public meaning. (For what it is worth, since publication, my 2005 paper has been cited more than 50 times.)
Seth
Barrett Tillman, A Textualist
Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v.
Virginia was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha was Wrongly
Reasoned, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1265
(2005). [4]
Professor Gary
Lawson, Comment, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment
Requirement for Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes
Clause, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1373 (2005). [5]
Seth
Barrett Tillman, The Domain of
Constitutional Delegations Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause: A
Reply to Professor Gary Lawson, 83 Tex.
L. Rev. 1389 (2005). [6]
[1] See, e.g., James Madison, Debates in the Federal
Convention of 1787, reprinted in 5 Debates
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in the Convention Held at
Philadelphia in 1787, at 109, 431 (Washington, Jonathan Elliot ed.,
supp. 1845) (recording the Philadelphia Convention’s August 15, 1787 debate); see also, e.g., Secretary William
Jackson, Journal of the Federal
Convention, in 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
at 294–296 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (recording the Philadelphia Convention’s August
15, 1787 motions and votes).
[2] See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The
Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, 3 Regulation 19, 20 (1979) (“The purpose
[of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3] . . . is to prevent Congress
from evading the President’s legislative role . . . by simply
acting through measures that are not called ‘bills.’”); Robert J. Spitzer,
112(2) Pol. Sci. Q. 261, 276 (1997)
(“Clause 3 was added to avoid a situation in which Congress might seek to avoid
presidential review of legislation by giving it some other name.” (quotation
marks omitted)); see also, e.g., Charles
L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution:
A Letter to a Congressman, 82 Yale
L.J. 189, 208 (1972) (“Can it be thought that Article I, Section 7, can
be evaded by mere nomenclature—by
merely calling something a ‘Concurrent’ rather than a ‘Joint’ Resolution?” (emphasis
in the original)); cf., e.g., Robert
W. Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional
Resolutions and Committees, 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 569, 572–74 (1953).
[3] 462
U.S. 919 (1983) (Burger, C.J.). There was also a cocurrence by Powell, and two dissents, by White and Rehnquist.
[4] See http://ssrn.com/abstract=475204.
[5] See http://ssrn.com/abstract=556789.
[6] See http://ssrn.com/abstract=658003.
Seth
Twitter: https://twitter.com/SethBTillman ( @SethBTillman )
My prior post: Seth Barrett Tillman, Tillman's “Has the Irish Court of Appeal Solved the Judicial Backlog?
Can it?” now available on SSRN, The New Reform Club (Sept. 28, 2016, 10:40 AM). [Here]