Seth Barrett Tillman,
Merryman Redux: A Response to Professor
John Yoo, 22 Chap. L. Rev. (forth. 2018–19) (manuscript at 4 n.12), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213353:
The
Constitution states: “The Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2
(emphasis added). President Lincoln’s order, issued on April 27, 1861, only
purported to give General Scott authority “to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus.” See 6 Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln,
1860–1861, at 258, 258 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., N.Y., The Lamb
Publishing Co. new ed. 1894) (reproducing Lincoln’s order); Seth Barrett
Tillman, Ex parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship, 224 Mil. L. Rev. 481, 527 & n.116 (2016)
(peer reviewed), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646888. But in his July 4, 1861
message to Congress, Lincoln recharacterized his prior order as permitting
suspension of the “privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.” 6 Complete Works,
supra, at 297, 308–09 (emphasis
omitted) (emphasis added). The difference between suspending the writ and
suspending the privilege of the writ is night-and-day. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 130–31 (1866) (Davis, J., for a unanimous Court) (“The
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself.” (emphasis
added)); see also, e.g., Ex parte Benedict,
3 F. Cas. 159, 174 (N.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1292) (Hall, J.) (“Such a suspension
may prevent the prisoner’s discharge; but it leaves untouched the question of
the illegality of his arrest, imprisonment, and deportation. If these are unlawful,
the marshal and others engaged in these arrests are liable in damages in a
civil prosecution; such damages to be assessed by a jury of the country.”). It
is not particularly surprising that these distinctions are no longer
understood, as this and much else relating to the Constitution’s original
public meaning was forgotten even as early as Lincoln’s day, and, in regard to
a few constitutional provisions and language, sometimes far earlier. But it is
curious how few even notice there is a puzzle to be solved and a past to be
explained. But see William Baude, The
Judgment Power, 96 Geo. L.J.
1807, 1853 n.255 (2008) (pointing out the same textual distinction regarding
the “privilege” of the writ and the writ itself, but not resolving the
distinction); but cf. Peter William Bautz, Lincoln’s Long
Shadow: Recreating the Legal Debate over Habeas Corpus, 1861–1863 passim (Master’s Thesis, University of
Virginia, Department of History, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y96uy8ys (collecting
some early authorities addressing the distinction).
My view
is that suspension of the evidentiary
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus precludes a court (or even an Executive
Branch officer) from taking cognizance of a party’s pleading (or invoking) the writ (once granted to that party by that
court or any other court of record) in subsequent contempt and enforcement proceedings (and,
perhaps, in other collateral and ancillary proceedings). E.g., Merryman II
(granting an order to serve an attachment for contempt where the defendant
failed to produce the prisoner-plaintiff). Suspending the writ (as opposed to suspending
the privilege of the writ) precludes a court from granting the writ, on the
merits, in the first instance. E.g., Merryman I (i.e., an ex parte habeas order
to produce a prisoner), or a Merryman III-like
order (i.e., a habeas order to release a prisoner—albeit, of course, this did not
actually happen in Merryman). When both
the writ and/or the privilege of the writ are suspended, federal courts (having
general federal question jurisdiction) will still have jurisdiction to determine
if the suspension or suspensions themselves are constitutional—unless Congress
has validly stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to do so. The scope of
Congress’s power to engage in such jurisdiction stripping is a complex subject,
and one well beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of
Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. Rev.
251, 289 (2005). Recently, the Suspension Clause has received renewed interest and
full-length treatment in books…but the meaning of the clause’s text…its actual words…they
remain largely an undiscovered country. See
generally, e.g., Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus in Wartime: From
the Tower of London to Guantanamo Bay (2017). But see Baude, supra at 1853
n.255; but cf. Bautz, supra passim. I have put down some truly
remarkable support for this position in another paper which this Response to Professor John Yoo is too
small to contain. (I submitted a prior draft of this lengthy footnote as my
abstract to the Tenth Annual Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference. See Tenth Annual Hugh & Hazel Darling
Foundation Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference, University of San Diego School of Law (last
accessed July 27, 2018), http://www.sandiego.edu/events/law/detail.php?_focus=66934.)
[end]
Seth Barrett Tillman, What is the “Privilege” of the Writ of Habeas Corpus?, New Reform Club (July 27, 2018, 2:41 AM),
https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2018/07/what-is-privilege-of-writ-of-habeas.html.
see also
https://twitter.com/SethBTillman/status/1022733915168165888
see also
https://twitter.com/SethBTillman/status/1022733915168165888