Addendum: Accepted Paper: Seth Barrett Tillman, Essay, Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emoluments” Problem, 40(3) Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming circa 2017–2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957162.
Recently, it has been argued that the term “emoluments” (as used in the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause[1] and Domestic Emoluments Clause[2]**) reaches any pecuniary advantage, benefit, or profit arising in connection with business transactions for value.[3] This position is incorrect. The Domestic Emoluments Clause states:
Recently, it has been argued that the term “emoluments” (as used in the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause[1] and Domestic Emoluments Clause[2]**) reaches any pecuniary advantage, benefit, or profit arising in connection with business transactions for value.[3] This position is incorrect. The Domestic Emoluments Clause states:
The
President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation,
which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he
shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States,
or any of them.[4]
If
the emoluments-are-any-pecuniary-advantage
position were correct, if “emoluments” as used in the Constitution extended to
any pecuniary advantage, then presidents are and would have been precluded from
doing business with the United States government.
However,
George Washington (who had previously been president of the Federal Convention
which drafted the Constitution[5]),
while he was President of the United States, did business on more than one
occasion with the Federal Government. He purchased several lots of land in the
new federal capital at public auction. One such set of purchases took place on
or about September 18, 1793.[6] Three
commissioners ran the public auction: David Stuart, Daniel Carroll, and Thomas
Johnson. Who were they?
· David
Stuart was a member of the Virginia convention which ratified the Federal Constitution.[7]
· Daniel
Carroll was a member of the Federal Convention which drafted the Constitution
and later a member of the First Congress.[8]
· Thomas
Johnson was the first Governor of Maryland following independence, a member of
the Maryland convention which ratified the Federal Constitution, and afterwards
he served as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.[9]
So
among the four participants (i.e., Washington and the three commissioners) were:
- three members of the Continental Congress;[10]
- two members of state ratification conventions;
- two members of the Federal Convention (including the Convention’s president);
- a member of the First Congress;
- a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States;
- a Governor; and,
- our first President.
An
undoubtedly accomplished group. Are we really to believe that not only did all
four participants willingly, openly, and notoriously participate in a
conspiracy to aid and abet the President in violating the Constitution’s
Domestic Emoluments Clause, but that they also left—for themselves and their
posterity—a complete and signed documentary trail of their wrongdoing?[11]
The
emoluments-are-any-pecuniary-advantage
position amounts to: (1) President Washington was at best an idiot, if not a
crook; (2) Washington’s allies openly supported obvious and profound constitutional
lawlessness; and (3) Washington’s political opponents[12] were
altogether and unaccountably silent—silent in Congress, silent in newspapers,
and silent in their private correspondence. The emoluments-are-any-pecuniary-advantage position amounts to a naked
assertion by twenty-first century legal academics that they understand the
Constitution’s original public meaning better than those who drafted it, and better
than those who ratified it, and better than those who put it into effect in the
First Congress.
The
alternative view is that linguistic and historical humility compel reasonable
minds to recognize that much of the language within our more than two-century
old Constitution is opaque. It follows that—in order for twenty-first century
citizens to understand what the Constitution’s opaque language meant when
ratified (and what it continues to mean now) in regard to a specific (but otherwise
wholly obscure) legal term (e.g., “emoluments”)—reasonable persons must look to
the actual conduct of the Framers, the Ratifiers, and the original practice of
the three branches when they were squarely confronted with the need to
determine the meaning of a particular legal term on concrete facts.
It
is incontrovertible that President George Washington, in a private capacity, engaged
in business transactions with the Federal Government, notwithstanding that he
received or intended to receive a pecuniary advantage. Given Washington’s very public
conduct,[13]
a modern interpreter should be reluctant to conclude that such advantages,
benefits, and profits amount to a constitutionally proscribed “emolument.” It stands
to reason that if the benefits flowing from business transactions for value (with
the Federal Government) are not constitutionally proscribed “emoluments” for
the purposes of the Domestic Emoluments Clause, then the benefits flowing from similar
transactions for value—with foreign states or foreign state owned or controlled
commercial entities[14]—are
not constitutionally proscribed “emoluments” for the purposes of any other
clause, including the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Both the Domestic Emoluments
Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause use the same “emoluments” language.[15]
Indeed,
from the perspective of modern (as opposed to eighteenth century) governance
norms, President Washington’s business transactions posed a nonfrivolous risk of
moral hazard, conflicts, and corruption. Unlike bargains struck between genuinely
adverse parties, President Washington was speculating on land in public auctions—that is, public auctions
managed by commissioners whom he personally appointed.[16] As
a result, Washington was on both sides of each and every one of these transactions;[17]
yet, no one then or since has ever impugned the propriety of his conduct, much
less the legal validity or constitutionality of his purchases.
Second,
as the President’s lawyers, at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (“MLB”),
explained the presents-language and
the emoluments-language in the original
Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause were imported into a proposed federal
constitutional amendment in 1810, the so-called Titles of Nobility Amendment.
In
1810, Congress voted by overwhelming margins to extend the Foreign Emoluments
Clause to all citizens, not just federal officials. The proposed amendment
would have prohibited private citizens’ acceptance of “any present, pension,
office, or emolument, of any kind whatever, from any Emperor, King, Prince, or
foreign Power,” stripping violators of their citizenship and barring them from
state or federal office. The amendment came within two states of
ratification—indeed, because of a publishing mistake, several generations
believed it was part of the
Constitution.
Yet
there is no evidence anyone at the time thought the proposed amendment
restricted citizens’ ability to engage in commerce with foreign nations, their
governments, their representatives, or their [commercial] instrumentalities [or
agents]. That suggests that the public did not understand the prohibition on
accepting [foreign presents or] foreign emoluments to prohibit commerce with
foreign states or their representatives through fair-market-value
exchanges—and, by implication, that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not
reach these transactions.[18]
MLB’s
argument remains wholly unrebutted by those suggesting that the Constitution’s presents-language and emoluments-language extend to business
transactions for value.[19]
Finally,
if there were any doubt that business transactions for value are not
“emoluments” for the purposes of the Domestic Emoluments Clause and the Foreign
Emoluments Clause, the Supreme Court laid that issue to rest in 1840. In Hoyt v. United States, the Court
explained:
These
terms [“fees” and “commissions”] denote a compensation for a particular kind of
service to be performed by the officer, and are distinguishable from each other
… they are also distinguishable from the term emoluments, that [term] being
more comprehensive, and embracing every species of compensation or pecuniary
profit derived from a discharge of the
duties of the office.[20]
President
Washington may very well have derived pecuniary advantages, benefits, and
profits from his business transactions with the Federal Government, but the
benefits flowing from those transactions were not “derived from [his] discharg[ing]
the duties of [his] office.”[21] Hence,
no constitutionally proscribed “emoluments” were involved.[22]
For
all the reasons elaborated above, one must conclude that business transactions
for value are not encompassed by the term “emoluments” as used in the
Constitution.
Seth Barrett Tillman***
Seth Barrett Tillman, Business
Transactions for Value Are Not “Emoluments”, The New Reform Club (Mar. 19, 2017, 3:15 AM), http://tinyurl.com/kos696z
Addendum: Accepted Paper: Seth Barrett Tillman, Essay, Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emoluments” Problem, 40(3) Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming circa 2017–2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957162.
*** Maynooth University Department of Law, New House (#53), Maynooth University, Maynooth, County Kildare, Ireland. sbarretttillman(at)yahoo.com. I received helpful comments, particularly in regard to finding sources, from several legal academics, historians (in academia and elsewhere), and listserv participants while developing this short paper. I thank them all; all errors remain mine. This short paper is cross-posted. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions For Value Are Not “Emoluments” (Mar. 19, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2937186; Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions For Value Are Not “Emoluments,” The New Reform Club (Mar. 19, 2017, 3:15 AM), http://tinyurl.com/lxash3w; see also Seth Barrett Tillman, Novel Questions of Pure Law and Discovery, The New Reform Club (Mar. 27, 2017, 6:58 AM), http://tinyurl.com/lpjudfk.
Addendum: Accepted Paper: Seth Barrett Tillman, Essay, Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emoluments” Problem, 40(3) Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming circa 2017–2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957162.
** I am following the odd naming convention for the clause used by
the Plaintiff in CREW v. President Trump, Civ. A. No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017) (Abrams, J.). See note
[2].
*** Maynooth University Department of Law, New House (#53), Maynooth University, Maynooth, County Kildare, Ireland. sbarretttillman(at)yahoo.com. I received helpful comments, particularly in regard to finding sources, from several legal academics, historians (in academia and elsewhere), and listserv participants while developing this short paper. I thank them all; all errors remain mine. This short paper is cross-posted. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions For Value Are Not “Emoluments” (Mar. 19, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2937186; Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions For Value Are Not “Emoluments,” The New Reform Club (Mar. 19, 2017, 3:15 AM), http://tinyurl.com/lxash3w; see also Seth Barrett Tillman, Novel Questions of Pure Law and Discovery, The New Reform Club (Mar. 27, 2017, 6:58 AM), http://tinyurl.com/lpjudfk.
[1] U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (the Foreign
Emoluments Clause, a/k/a Foreign Gifts (or Titles) Clause, or Emoluments Clause)
(“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under the[] [United States],
shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument,
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign
State.”).
[2] U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. cl. 7 (the
so-called Domestic Emoluments Clause, a/k/a Presidential Compensation (or
Emoluments) Clause).
[3] If the
subject matter of our inquiry were something other than an exchange for value,
we would be discussing either: (1) a present, or (2) a bribe. Textually, the Domestic
Emoluments Clause does not extend to presents. Likewise, bribery is expressly
dealt with by the Impeachment Clause, U.S. Const.
art. II, § 4, not by either the Foreign Emoluments Clause or the Domestic
Emoluments Clause.
[4] U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. cl. 7 (emphasis added).
[5] See Washington, George (1732–1799), Biographical Directory of the United States
Congress (last visited Feb. 14, 2017), http://tinyurl.com/l5vpnzk (also reporting that Washington was a member of the Continental
Congress).
[6] See Certificate
for Lots Purchased in the District of Columbia, 18 September 1793, Founders Online (last visited Feb. 14,
2017), http://tinyurl.com/gtpw5mm.
[7] See 3 The
Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787,
at 654 & 662 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington 2d ed. 1836) (recording
Stuart’s votes on June 25 and 27, 1788), http://tinyurl.com/l6ypss2.
Stuart was also a federal elector for Virginia in the first federal election. See 3 The
Documentary History of the First Federal Elections 1788–1790, at xvi
(Gordon DenBoer ed., 1986), http://tinyurl.com/kvbwrou.
[8] See Carroll, Daniel (1730–1796), Biographical Directory of the United States
Congress (last visited Feb. 14, 2017), http://tinyurl.com/hxf9dyx (also reporting that Carroll was a member of the Continental
Congress and signed the Articles of Confederation).
[9] See Johnson, Thomas (1732–1819), Biographical Directory of the United States
Congress (last visited Feb. 14, 2017), http://tinyurl.com/lwxw22r (also reporting that Johnson was a member of the Continental
Congress and first Governor of Maryland following independence).
[10] See supra notes 5, 8–9.
[11] See, e.g., Certificate for Lots Purchased in the District of Columbia, 18
September 1793, Founders Online
(last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (reproducing a certificate of purchase signed by
Commissioners David Stuart and Daniel Carroll which stated: “At a Public Sale
of Lots in the City of Washington, George
Washington, President of the United States of America became purchaser of
Lots No. twelve, No. thirteen & No. fourteen in Square No. six hundred
& sixty seven . . . .” (emphasis added)), http://tinyurl.com/gtpw5mm. In addition to
lots nos. 12, 13, and 14, Washington also purchased lot no. 5, and he received
a separate certificate confirming this additional purchase. See id. (editors’ notes). See generally, e.g., Letter from President George Washington to the Commissioners (Mar.
14, 1794), in The Writings of George
Washington Relating to the National Capital, 17 Records of the Columbia Hist. Soc. 3, 97 (1914) (indicating
that Washington believed and intended that his purchases of public land were
known to the public), http://www.jstor.org.jproxy.nuim.ie/stable/pdf/40067048.pdf.
[12] In 1793,
during the Third Congress, the year President Washington made these land
purchases at public auctions, there were some 13 anti-administration Senators
and some 40 anti-administration Representatives. See Biographical Directory of
the United States Congress (last visited Feb. 14, 2017), http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp
(enter “Representative” or “Senator” for “Position:” and enter “1793” for “Year
or Congress:”); see also, e.g., Letter
from President George Washington to Bushrod Washington (July 27, 1789), in 30 The
Papers of George Washington 366, 366 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)
(“My political conduct . . . must be exceedingly circumspect and proof against
just criticism, for the Eyes of Argus are upon me, and no slip will pass
unnoticed that can be improved into a supposed partiality for friends or
relatives.”), https://www.loc.gov/resource/mgw2.017/?sp=26;
infra note 13.
[13] See Akhil
Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We
Live By 309 (2012) (“Over the centuries, the constitutional
understandings that crystallized during the Washington administration have
enjoyed special authority on a wide range of issues . . . .”); see also
Seth Barrett Tillman, Who Can
Be President of the United States?: Candidate Hillary Clinton and the Problem
of Statutory Qualifications, 5(1) Br.
J. Am. Leg. Studies 95 (2016) (peer reviewed), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2679512:
Evidence arising
in connection with the Washington administration is generally considered
superior to that of later administrations. Why? First, Washington’s
administration was contemporaneous with the Constitution’s ratification.
Second, the President was a Framer and his cabinet (and administration)
contained other prominent Framers and ratifiers. Indeed, between the President
and his nine cabinet members (over the course of two terms), half of the group
were either Framers or ratifiers or both. Third, the President saw himself
above party or faction; indeed, active partisan federal electoral politics did
not arise until after Washington announced that he would not run for a third
term. Fourth, Washington both valued his
reputation for probity and acted under the assumption that his conduct was
closely monitored by political opponents and opportunists. Fifth,
Washington understood that his personal and his administration’s conduct were
precedent-setting in regard not only to significant deeds, but even in regard
to what might appear to be minor events and conduct.
Id. at 105–08 (emphasis added) (footnotes with
supporting sources omitted); supra note
12.
[14] In regard
to the Domestic Emoluments Clause, where the federal government or a state
government engages in a business transaction with a private commercial entity
owned (in whole or in significant part) or controlled (in whole or in
significant part) by the President of
the United States (in his private capacity), but not with the President, it is not clear that such a
transaction falls under the aegis of the Domestic Emoluments Clause. See supra note 2. Indeed, no court of
the United States (of which the Author is aware) has had occasion to resolve
this novel threshold question of pure law. This issue must be resolved in any
litigation seeking to assert that the Domestic Emoluments Clause applies to such
business transactions with the President. As a question of pure law, this issue
ought to be judicially resolved prior to any court ordered discovery.
Much
the same can be said in regard to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. No court of
the United States (of which the Author is aware) has had occasion to determine
whether a foreign state owned or foreign state controlled commercial entity is
a “foreign state” for the purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. See supra note 1. This is a novel
threshold question of pure law which must be resolved in any litigation seeking
to assert that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to business transactions
between a constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder (i.e., an “officer …
under the United States”) and a foreign state owned or foreign state controlled
commercial entity. As a question of pure law, this issue ought to be judicially
resolved prior to any court ordered discovery. Similarly, where a foreign state
engages in a business transaction with a private commercial entity owned (in
whole or in significant part) or controlled (in whole or in significant part)
by a constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder (in his private capacity),
but not with the officeholder, it is not clear that such a transaction falls
under the aegis of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Indeed, no court of the
United States (of which the Author is aware) has had occasion to resolve this
novel threshold question of pure law. This issue, too, must be resolved in any
litigation seeking to assert that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to
business transactions between private commercial entities owned or controlled
by a constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder and a foreign state. And,
here too, as a question of pure law, this issue ought to be judicially resolved
prior to any court ordered discovery. Where a transaction has a commercial
entity on both sides, as opposed to an actual foreign state and an actual
constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder, the policy concerns animating
the Foreign Emoluments Clause must be much attenuated.
[15] See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying
text; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,
112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 748 (1999).
[16] See Letter from George Washington,
President of the United States of America, to All Who Shall See These Presents
(Jan. 22, 1791), in The Writings of
George Washington Relating to the National Capital, supra note 11, at 3 (appointing Johnson, Carroll, and Stuart
commissioners), http://www.jstor.org.jproxy.nuim.ie/stable/pdf/40067048.pdf.
[17] Oliver
Evans held U.S. Patent #3: a patent for an automated grain milling system. This
patent was issued by Executive Branch officers responsible to President
Washington during his first term in office. Indeed, President Washington
personally reviewed and signed the patent application. See George Washington
upgraded his milling operation by installing improvements invented by Oliver
Evans, George Washington’s Mount
Vernon (last visited Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.mountvernon.org/the-estate-gardens/gristmill/oliver-evans/.
Subsequently, in 1791, “Washington purchased a license for the patent and had
the milling system installed in his [Mount Vernon] gristmill.” See George Washington constructed a large,
extremely profitable gristmill at Mount Vernon using cutting-edge technology of
the time, George Washington’s Mount
Vernon (last visited Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.mountvernon.org/the-estate-gardens/gristmill/.
Here too, President Washington was on both sides of the transaction at issue. This
another good example indicating that modern fiduciary governance standards are
wholly unrelated to the original public meaning of the Constitution’s Domestic
Emoluments Clause and Foreign Emoluments Clause. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Elana Nightingale Dawson, “Worse than the Disease”: The
Anti-Corruption Principle, Free Expression, and the Democratic Process, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1053, 1068 (2012)
(distinguishing the “Framers’ limited prophylactic approach” from Professor
Teachout’s position); Adrian Vermeule, The
Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 501, 510 (2001) (denominating the Domestic
Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause “limited anticorruption
provisions”). See generally Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (issuing a decision by Chief Justice
Marshall, notwithstanding his having previously been a key federal official who
was in part responsible for the facts giving rise to the litigation).
[18] Sheri
Dillon et al., Moran, Lewis & Bockius LLP White Paper, Conflicts of
Interest and the President, 4–5 (Jan. 11, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3280261/MLB-White-Paper-1-10-Pm.pdf
(footnotes omitted).
[19] Id.
[20] 51 U.S.
(10 How.) 109, 135 (1850) (Nelson, J.) (emphasis added). Justice Nelson’s
definition of “emolument” has been cited approvingly by the Executive Branch. See, e.g., Memorandum from Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., Dep’y Asst. Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, for H. Gerald
Staub, Office of Chief Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Re:
Emoluments Clause Questions Raised by NASA Scientist’s Proposed Consulting
Arrangement with the University of New South Wales, 1986 WL 1239553, at *1 n.4
(May 23, 1986), https://www.justice.gov/olc/page/file/936146/download.
[21] Hoyt, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 135.
[22] See generally Andy Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief
Executive, 102 Minn. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2902391;
Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of ‘Emoluments’ in the Constitution
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2911871.
Hoyt v. United States
ReplyDeleteseems completely on point, but Laurence Tribe, et al, are still nattering at Trump on this